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I. Introduction

Economic growth is very much a post-colonial phenomenon in South Asia. The first half of the twentieth century, which spanned the final era of British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent, witnessed the emergence of a nascent modern industry and some improvement in physical infrastructure, but overall economic growth was still very slow. During the period from 1990 to 1946, the gross domestic product (GDP) of British India​[1]​ crawled at the rate of 0.8 per cent per annum. With population growing at about the same rate, this meant complete stagnation in terms of per capita real income. The final decade and a half of the colonial era, starting from the onset of the Great Depression, was especially difficult. Per capita income actually fell during this period at the rate of 0.5 per cent per annum, culminating in a devastating famine in 1943 that claimed at least 1.5 million lives in Bengal (situated in the eastern part of British India).​[2]​ 

The end of colonial rule in 1947 marked the beginning of modern economic growth in South Asia. The governments of the newly independent countries made a determined effort to lift their economies to a higher growth path, by altering the colonial structure of production with the help of a series of economic plans. The results have been quite impressive, in comparison with the past, even if they are not as spectacular as those achieved by some high performing countries of East and South-East Asia. The GDP of South Asia grew at the rate of 4.7 per annum in the 45 years during 1960-2005, in contrast to less than one per cent growth recorded in the first 45 years of the twentieth century.​[3]​ Even though population growth also accelerated sharply at the same time – from 0.8 per cent in the first half of the twentieth century to 2.2 per cent during 1960-2005 – the pace of economic growth was strong enough offset the surge in population. Per capita income grew at the rate of 2.5 per cent during 1960-2005, ending the spell of stagnation that had prevailed in the final half century of colonial rule. The rate of 2.5 per cent may not seem particularly fast, especially in comparison with the super fast growth rates being achieved of late by some Asian countries, but its cumulative effect on the living standards of the South Asian people has still been substantial. This is evident from the contrast that while the generation of South Asians that achieved independence from colonial rule in the middle of the twentieth century was on the average no better off than their predecessors who lived half a century earlier, their progeny who live today, half a century later, are three times richer than them.

This paper is about understanding the forces behind this upsurge in economic growth in the post-colonial period, with a special focus on the policies and institutions that were put in place by the governments of South Asia in pursuit of economic emancipation. As we shall see, the path of economic growth traversed by South Asia since the middle of the twentieth century has been far from smooth. Leaving aside purely short-term fluctuations caused by weather or exogenous shocks, there have been fairly longish periods of relatively strong and weak growth across the region. Interestingly, the time pattern of this uneven growth has been strikingly similar for all countries of the region, so that one can speak of a pattern for the region as a whole. This pattern consists of three distinct phases – an early phase of growth that starts at the middle of the twentieth century and ends with the closing of the 1960s, a middle phase of slow growth during the 1970s, which this paper calls the ‘‘dismal decade’’ of South Asia, and finally the phase of growth revival from the end of the 1970s up to the present. Explaining these three phases of growth is the central concern of this paper.

At this point, it is perhaps useful to clarify what this paper is not about. First, even though the paper begins in the next section by setting South Asia’s growth performance in a comparative perspective vis-à-vis rest of the developing world, it does not attempt to explain why South Asia has grown slower or faster than other countries or regions. Second, the paper does not attempt to examine in any details the nexus between growth performance on the one hand and the evolution of poverty and income distribution on the other. The focus in on explaining the growth performance itself. Third, even while examining the growth performance, no attempt is made to provide a comprehensive analysis. In particular, unlike the literature on cross-country growth regressions currently in vogue, this paper does not try to examine in details either the proximate determinants of growth – such as factor accumulation and technology, or all the ultimate determinants – such as institutions, geography, or history. The focus of this paper is on policies, which can be taken to occupy some intermediate position between proximate and ultimate determinants, and to examine their role in shaping the three phases of growth described above. Elements of both proximate and ultimate determinants do of course enter the story told here, but more as a means of illuminating the role played by policies than in their own right.

There exists a popular view regarding the role of policies in shaping the phases of growth in South Asia. At the cost of slight oversimplication, this view may be summed up as follows: the first phase of growth was stimulated by planned industrialization based on the strategy of import substitution and widespread protection; the second phase of slow growth emerged when the cumulative cost of inefficient import substitution began to take its toll; and the final phase of growth revival was unleashed only when (and only to the extent that) there occurred a strategic shift towards a more liberal trade policy. This paper argues that despite the popularity of this view, its focus on trade policy has very limited explanatory power. Although trade policy has been important, other aspects of the policy regime have perhaps been even more so in generating the three phases of growth in South Asia. These policies include state intervention in all aspects of the industrial scene either directly in the form of public ownership or indirectly through a web of administrative control, the conduct of macroeconomic policies affecting aggregate demand, and policies towards agriculture.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II places the post-colonial growth performance of South Asia in an international comparative perspective. Section III identifies the phases of growth in South Asia and offers a brief account of how the first phase of moderate growth entered into the second phase – the ‘‘dismal decade’’ of the 1970s. Section IV undertakes a detailed analysis the policies and processes that led to the emergence of the ‘‘dismal decade’’. The story of the region’s transition to a higher growth path in the 1980s and beyond is told in Section V. Finally, section VI concludes by making some generalizations about South Asian growth performance and identifying some crucial bottleneck to future growth.


II. South Asian Growth in a Comparative Perspective

The combined economy of South Asia has grown at the rate of 4.7 per cent per annum during 1961-2005, which translates into 2.5 per cent growth in per capita terms (Table 1). Growth performance of the region has improved significantly in recent decades in comparison with the immediate post-independence period. The spectacular rise of India in the last few years has attracted a lot of attention worldwide, but in varying degrees other countries of the region have also performed better in recent times, setting the region as a whole to a higher growth path. Thus, GDP growth of South Asia as a whole has accelerated from around 3.7 per cent in the two decades prior to 1980 to 5.5 per cent in the subsequent two decades and a half. At the same time, population growth has decelerated slightly from 2.3 per cent to 2.0 per cent, heralding the onset of demographic transition in large parts of the region. As a result, the region has seen a nearly three-fold increase in the growth of per capita income – from 1.3 per cent during 1961-1980 to 3.5 per cent during 1981-2005.

The region’s performance can be seen in a comparative perspective from Tables 2 and 3, which give South Asia’s growth rates along with those of other developing regions as well as some large populous countries such as Brazil, China and Indonesia. In the four and a half decades since 1960, South Asia’s performance stands second only to that of East Asia and the Pacific. It is important to note, however, that the high rank of South Asia’s owes itself entirely to the growth acceleration that occurred since 1980. During the two decades from 1960 to 1980, South Asia was in fact the worst performer in the developing world. Its average GDP growth of 3.7 per cent during this period was not only well below the average for all low and middle income countries, it was also lower than the growth achieved by Sub-Saharan Africa. It is only since the 1980s that South Asia has emerged as a strong performer, eclipsed only by East Asia and the Pacific.




Table 1

Growth in South Asia: 1960 – 2005
(Average annual growth rates)

	1961-2005	1961 - 1980	1981 - 2005
			
GDP	4.68	3.66	5.50
Population	2.16	2.33	2.02
Per capita GDP	2.53	1.33	3.49
			
Note: GDP is measured at market prices and in constant US dollars of 2000.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.






Table 2

Growth of South Asia in Comparative Perspective:
GDP Growth, 1960 – 2005
(Average annual growth rates)

	1961-2005	1961 - 1980	1981 - 2005
			
South Asia	4.68	3.66	5.50
Brazil	4.51	7.35	2.23
China	7.89	5.47	9.83
Indonesia	5.61	6.03	5.28
East Asia and Pacific	6.99	5.66	8.05
Middle East and North Africa	4.58	6.26	3.56
Latin America and the Caribbean	3.74	5.54	2.30
Sub-Saharan Africa 	3.34	4.33	2.56
Low and Middle Income Countries	4.41	5.22	3.77
			
Note: GDP is measured at market prices and in constant US dollars of 2000.
Source: South Asian figures are author’s own estimates based on country data. The rest are based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2007.


Table 3

Growth of South Asia in Comparative Perspective:
Per Capita GDP Growth, 1960 – 2005
(Average annual growth rates)

	1961-2005	1961 - 1980	1981 - 2005
			
South Asia	2.53	1.33	3.49
Brazil	2.42	4.78	0.52
China	6.40	3.54	8.69
Indonesia	3.72	3.75	3.69
East Asia and Pacific	5.33	3.59	6.73
Middle East and North Africa	2.02	3.47	1.15
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.63	2.97	0.55
Sub-Saharan Africa 	0.64	1.61	-0.14
Low and Middle Income Countries	2.51	3.04	2.09
			
Note: GDP is measured at market prices and in constant US dollars of 2000.
Source: South Asian figures are author’s own estimates based on country data. The rest are based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2007.


Further insight into the contrast between South Asia and the rest of the developing world can be gained by disaggregating the growth performance into decadal averages (Table 4). This exercise reveals that even though South Asia’s performance in the 1960s was slightly worse than that of other regions it was the decade of the 1970s that really pulled it down in the pre-1980 period. From 4.3 per cent in the 1960s South Asia’s growth declined to barely 3.0 per cent in the 1970s, while the low and middle income countries as a whole more or less maintained their growth rate at around 5.2 per cent. 


Table 4

Comparative GDP Growth by Decades: 1960 – 2005
(Average annual growth rates)

	1961 - 1970	1971 – 1980	1981 - 1990	1991 - 2000	2001 - 2005
					
South Asia	4.30	3.01	5.66	5.25	5.69
Brazil	6.19	8.51	1.65	2.56	2.75
China	4.65	6.28	9.35	10.45	9.54
Indonesia	4.18	7.87	6.41	4.43	4.73
East Asia and Pacific	4.73	6.59	7.56	8.43	8.26
Middle East and North Africa	8.47	5.16	2.99	3.95	3.93
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.36	5.73	1.19	3.30	2.52
Sub-Saharan Africa 	4.95	3.71	1.87	2.27	4.49
Low and Middle Income Countries	5.18	5.25	3.01	3.78	5.28
					
Note: GDP is measured at market prices and in constant US dollars of 2000.
Source: South Asian figures are author’s own estimates based on country data. The rest are based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2007.

There was, however, a reversal of fortune in the 1980s when the group of low and middle income countries saw their growth rate dip to 3.0 per cent, while South Asia’s growth rate soared to 5.7 per cent. It is well-known that this reversal was especially pronounced for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, who suffered severely as a fall-out of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent economic adjustments, so much so that the decade of the 1980s has come to be described as the ‘lost decade’ for these two continents. What is perhaps less well-known, especially outside South Asia, is that one decade before the debt crisis engulfed the rest of the world, this region too had its own downward slide. Even if the extent of this slide does not seem severe enough to warrant the description of a ‘lost decade’, the 1970s can still be described as the ‘dismal decade’ for South Asia.

As we shall see in the next section, the ‘dismal decade’ was a common phenomenon across the region. The growth rate of all five countries dipped in the 1970s compared to earlier decades, though for some countries the dip was more pronounced than for others. By the same token, the recovery in the 1980s and beyond was also a common phenomenon, even though the extent and durability of recovery varied across countries. Precisely how all five countries plunged into a crisis around 1970 and how they all recovered (more or less) after 1980 remains one of the liveliest issues of debate among the scholars of South Asia – one that forms the subject of enquiry of the present paper.


II. The Phases of Growth in South Asia: 1950-2005

The economic history of South Asia from 1950 to 2005 can be seen to have gone through three broad phases: the first phase comprising roughly the first two decades, the second phase spanning the next decade or so, and the final phase covering the rest. This phasing is based on two criteria – average growth performance within a given period and the nature of the policy regime. Thus, the second phase is characterised on the one hand by poorer growth performance compared to the first and on the other by some distinctive features of the policy regime that represent partly a departure from and partly an intensification of the previous the policy regime.​[4]​ The third phase in turn sets itself apart from the second firstly on the ground of a much improved growth performance and secondly in terms of a significant departure from the past policy regimes. Examining the causal connections between these shifts in the policy regime and changes in growth performance is the central concern of this paper.

A couple of points regarding the proposed phasing should be noted. First, the specification of the phasing suggested here should be taken as a broad generalization, since there are quite distinct sub-phases within them, especially within the final phase. Secondly, the precise dating of the three phases must allow for country-specificities and hence cannot be identical for all five countries under consideration. On both counts judgements must be applied. On the question of sub-phases, the position taken here is that a more detailed phasing may be appropriate for analysing the history of individual countries but not of the region as a whole because the sub-phases do not show the same common pattern across the countries as do the three broad phases identified above.

On the dating of the three phases, we have relied mainly, but not entirely, on the judgements of the authors of the country studies. The crucial judgements involved are in deciding the timing of the second phase. For India, we go along with the judgement of Acharya et al. (2003) that this phase is best defined as the period from 1967/68 to 1980/81. By 1966/67, the economy of India had come to a critical turning point, battered by two successive years of drought, an expensive war with Pakistan in 1965 and worsening relations with donor countries. In view of the predicament, the traditional practice of producing Five Year Development Plans had been temporarily suspended, some hesitant attempts to liberalise the economy had been promptly abandoned and the manufacturing sector was about to enter a prolonged phase of slow growth. For the next decade or so, the policy regime became more control-oriented, its political underpinning being provided by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s rhetoric of socialism. By the late 1970s, winds of change had already begun to blow towards liberalising the policy regime but gathered momentum only in the early 1980s, which can therefore be taken as the terminal point of the second phase.

In Pakistan, the turning point came in December 1971, when East Pakistan broke away as an independent state, more than a decade of rule by the military came to end, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed power though democratic elections with an explicit socialist agenda whose avowed objective was to initiate a radical departure from the development strategy of the past. This change of political and economic regime ushered in a period of economic slowdown, which ended with another regime change in 1977 when President Zia ul Haq ousted Bhutto to reintroduce military rule. The period from 1971/72 to 1976/77 can thus be described as Pakistan’s second phase.

In Sri Lanka, as in Pakistan, the second phase neatly coincided with change in political regime. It started in 1970, with the electoral victory of the United Front (UF), a left-wing coalition led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and ended in 1977 with the return to power of the right-of-the-centre United National Party (UNP). In the intervening period, the United Front government sought to implement a socialist agenda and presided over what was undoubtedly the darkest period in Sri Lanka’s economic history until that time. The economic gloom lifted only with the radical change in economic regime introduced by the UNP government from 1977 onwards.

For Bangladesh and Nepal, the first phase has been left outside the scope of this study – in the case of Bangladesh because it started its existence as an independent state only from December 1971, and in the case of Nepal because economic statistics prior to 1970 are exceedingly scarce. Their story thus begins with the second phase, which goes from 1972/73 to 1980/81 for Bangladesh and from 1970/71 to 1979/80 for Nepal. Although for the purposes of our present analysis the first phase is absent for both of them, the description of the 1970s as their second phase is still justified on the grounds of growth performance during this period relative to their past and subsequent history. In the whole of the 1970s, for example, Bangladesh’s GDP growth was only about 1 per cent per annum compared to 4 per cent in the 1960s when it was still East Pakistan. This drastic fall in growth was primarily a consequence of the large-scale destruction caused by a prolonged Liberation war. The GDP of the country recovered to the pre-independence level only by 1981, which is therefore taken as the terminal point of the second phase (Mujeri and Sen, 2002). In the case of Nepal, what little evidence exists for the 1960s shows that the overall GDP growth was very slow – only around 2.5 per cent per annum, but it became slower still in the 1970s, falling to 2.1 per cent. The onset of the 1980s, however, witnessed an impressive turnaround in growth performance, with GDP growing at close to 5 per cent rate for the decade as a whole. The 1970s can, therefore, be rightly regarded as Nepal’s ‘‘dismal decade’’.

Table 5 gives a summary view of the country-specific periodisation of the phases of growth in South Asia. The remainder of this section offers a brief account of the transition from the first phase to the second in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as a prelude to the causal analyses presented in the next two sections.​[5]​



Table 5

Phases of Growth in South Asia: 1950-2005

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
			
India	1950/51 – 1966-67	1967/68 – 1980/81	1981/82 – 2004/05
Pakistan	1950/51 – 1970/71	1971/72 – 1976/77	1977/78 - 2004/05
Sri Lanka	1950 – 1970	1971 – 1977	1978 - 2005
Bangladesh	---	1972/73 – 1980/81	1980/81 - 2004/05
Nepal	---	1970/71 – 1980/81	1980/81 - 2004/05
			



India 

From the very beginning, Indian planning laid heavy emphasis on fostering rapid industrial growth. The industrial strategy that evolved in the post-Independence period was based on several pillars. First and foremost was the idea propounded by Prime Minister Nehru and his principal planner P. C. Mahalanobis that rapid industrial growth required early emphasis on the development of a broad-based capital goods sector. Second, since the development of the capital goods sector involved ‘building ahead of demand’, the private sector could not be entrusted with this task; instead, the public sector had to lead the way, while the consumer goods sector could be left primarily to the private sector. Third, the pattern of resource allocation by the private sector had to be aligned to the pattern desired by the planners mostly through a system of direct controls as opposed the use of price signals – a view that was born out of a deep distrust of the market mechanism, itself a legacy of British colonial policy in India. Finally, import substitution was accepted as the main route to industrialization – a decision born partly of the experience of a successful bout of import substituting industrialization that occurred during the Great Depression and partly of the ‘export pessimism’ that prevailed in the developing world at the time. 

For a while, Indian planning strategy seemed like a grand success. Economic growth of post-colonial India started in a confident fashion with the launching of the First Five-Year Plan (1951-56). The Plan set a target of 2.1 per cent growth in per capita income, which would represent a quantum jump from the stagnation of the preceding half century, and achieved it. The performance of the economy improved further in the next five years, as the rate of GDP growth rose from 3.7 per cent during the First Five-Year Plan to 4.2 per cent during the Second Five Year Plan (1957-1961). Thus on the whole the decade of the 1950s came to be viewed as an auspicious start to India’s ambition to break the shackles of colonial stagnation.

But this ambition received a severe jolt in the 1960s, when GDP growth declined to 2.8 per cent during the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66). The primary reason for this deceleration was poor performance of agriculture. In the 1950s, agriculture had grown healthily at around 3 per cent per annum, based primarily on the expansion of cultivable area. By the end of the decade, however, the frontier of expansion had almost been reached and no yield-raising technological breakthrough was yet in sight. Prolonged droughts in the middle of the 1960s made matters worse. As a result, agricultural growth turned negative during the Third Plan period (1961-66). An acute scarcity of foodgrains emerged in the mid-1960s as the effect of declining production was compounded by reduced import when the US government refused to renew the PL480 agreement for food aid in the aftermath of the war with Pakistan in 1965. The spectre of famine loomed large and many observers predicted mass starvation in the coming decade.

As it happened, however, agriculture bounced back strongly soon afterwards, spurred by the introduction of Green Revolution technology. Rising yield per hectare helped overcome the constraint of closing frontiers, with the result that agricultural growth jumped to an average of 3.3 per cent per annum during 1968/69-1980/81. This remarkable turnaround in agricultural productivity helped avert the danger of mass starvation that had seemed inevitable in the mid-1960s.

The most extra-ordinary aspect of the post-1967 period, however, was that despite the strong revival of agriculture the overall economy failed to grow significantly faster during the 1970s. The effect of agricultural acceleration was almost wholly nullified by sharp deceleration in industrial growth, which fell from 6.3 per cent per annum during 1951-67 to 4.1 per cent during 1968-81 (Table 6). Overall growth remained virtually stagnant. Precisely at a time when the countries of East and South-east Asia were beginning to reach growth rates of 5 per cent and above, India seemed incapable of moving beyond a trend growth of 3.5 per cent or so, which came to be described, somewhat derisorily, as the ‘Hindu rate of growth’. 

The failure to move on to a higher growth trajectory in the 1970s was particularly disappointing. The vicissitudes of the 1960s could, with some justice, be put down partly to the vagaries of nature and partly to the absence of yield-enhancing technologies in agriculture until the arrival of Green Revolution in the late 1960s. But the failure of the 1970s was viewed largely as a failure of India’s development strategy, in particular of its strategy of industrialization.


Table 6

Phases of Growth in India: 1951-52 to 2004-05
(Average annual growth rates)

	1952-1967	1968 - 1981	1982 - 2005
			
Agriculture	1.77	3.33	3.02
Industry	6.27	4.08	6.02
     Manufacturing	5.91	4.28	6.09
Services	4.36	4.46	7.17
Total GDP	3.49	3.85	5.65
			
Population	1.88	2.28	2.00
Per capita GDP growth	1.61	1.56	3.65
			
Note: GDP is measured at factor cost and in constant prices of 1999-2000.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.



Pakistan

At the time of Independence, Pakistan was poorer than India and lacked most of the basic infrastructure required to make the transition to a modern industrial economy. On gaining Independence, rapid industrialization became the central theme of the development strategy of Pakistan. Like other countries of the region, Pakistan too chose the import-substituting path to industrialization. This choice was dictated partly by the need to deal with the serious shortage of foreign exchange that had emerged at the end of the Korean boom in 1952 and partly as a deliberate policy to stimulate private investment in manufacturing under a protective umbrella. Direct involvement of the public sector in manufacturing activity was minimal, but the policy regime was otherwise characterised by an excessive reliance on economic controls in the form of administered prices, industrial licensing and a host of other regulations.

The policy regime did succeed in stimulating strong industrial growth, which averaged over 8 per cent per annum in the 1950s, although the high rate of growth was no doubt partly a reflection of the extremely low base from which expansion started. Industrial growth was underpinned by an investment boom that saw the rate of investment rising from just 4 per cent of GDP in 1949/50 to 11.5 per cent in 1959/60. Public sector led the way in this area, by building the infrastructure necessary for the expansion of private industry. Generous inflow of foreign aid from the western donors, who viewed Pakistan as a crucial ally in the Cold War, combined with the siphoning of surplus from the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) helped raise the rate of public sector investment from a lowly 1.6 per cent of GDP in 1949/50 to an impressive 7.2 per cent by 1959/60.

The overall GDP growth was still quite modest, however, with the GDP growth of 3 per cent per annum being barely sufficient to offset population growth. The reason for slow growth lay in the neglect of agriculture in the early stage of development. Not only did the excessive protection given to industry acted as a disincentive to private investment in agriculture; the government also did nothing by way of either investing in agricultural infrastructure or reforming the moribund feudal structure that had stymied the rural economy. The government did seem to wake up, however, to the problems of agriculture in the second half of the decade. In 1956, it announced a comprehensive strategy for agricultural development, but the policies remained largely unimplemented in the midst of political upheavals following the military coup of 1958. As a result, agriculture grew very slowly, at an average of 1.6 per annum, in the whole of the 1950s.

All this changed in the 1960s, when strong agricultural growth complemented even stronger industrial growth to transform Pakistan into one of the best performing economies of the contemporary developing world. Heavy public investment in the water sector in the first half of the decade combined with the Green Revolution technology in the second half helped boost agricultural productivity. With the government willing to provide generous help by way of input subsidy and price support, agriculture was able to grow at the exceptionally high rate of 5 per cent per annum in the decade. 

At the same time, industry continued its upward march at an accelerated rate compared in the 1950s. Several factors contributed to the exceptionally high growth of industry. First, continued heavy protection of import substituting industries was supplemented by special measures of support for the export-oriented industries (e.g., the Bonus Voucher Scheme) and they together created a highly favourable atmosphere for private investment. Second, rapid expansion of cotton production (owing mainly to the expansion of irrigation facilities) provided strong forward linkage to the cotton textiles, which was the backbone of Pakistan’s industry. Third, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) acted as a captive market for the growing consumer goods industries.

The strategy of boosting agriculture and industry simultaneously resulted in further intensification of the investment boom that had already started in the 1950s. The rate of investment over the 1960s as a whole was a highly impressive 19 per cent of GDP, which was by far the highest achieved by any country in this region, including India, during this period. Not surprisingly, the economy accelerated sharply, with the GDP growth more than doubling from the average of 3 per cent per annum in the 1950s to 6.8 per cent in the 1960s. Pakistan came to be looked upon as one of the shining stars among the developing countries.​[6]​

The advent of the 1970s, however, ushered in a fundamental break in the political and economic history of Pakistan. East Pakistan broke away as independent Bangladesh in 1971 through a bloody and protracted war. The trauma of the war and the loss of a captive market dented the economic dynamism that had gathered steam in the 1960s. More significant though was the consequence of regime change, when the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed power by sweeping away the discredited military in 1972. The new regime, which lasted till July 1977, set upon a course of economic and social policies that constituted a radical departure from the past – it was egalitarian in its avowed objectives and statist in its approach towards economic and social issues. Bhutto’s regime was populist and also very popular at least initially, but the actual economic performance during his regime turned out to be disastrous. During the period from 1971/72 to 1976/77, growth of GDP plummeted to 4.4 per cent from the height of 6.8 per cent in the 1960s. There was an all-round slide of the economy, as agricultural growth fell from 5 per cent to 2.3 per cent per annum; and manufacturing growth fell even more sharply – from almost 10 per cent to just 3.3 per cent (Table 7). Pakistan’s economy had entered its ‘dismal decade’, from which deliverance would come only after the political regime changed once again in 1977 when General Zia usurped power through a military coup.


Table 7

Phases of Growth in Pakistan: 1951-52 – 2004-05
(Average annual growth rates)

	1952-1971	1972 - 1977	1978 - 2005
			
Agriculture	3.12	2.37	3.91
Industry	9.56	4.75	6.66
     Manufacturing	8.72	3.34	7.13
Services	5.04	6.47	5.46
Total GDP	4.82	4.42	5.44
			
Population	3.1	2.65	2.54
Per capita GDP growth	1.72	1.77	2.90
			
Note: GDP is measured at factor cost and in constant prices of 1999-2000.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.



Sri Lanka

Despite having a common legacy of British colonial rule, Sri Lanka started out its post-Independence era in a very different condition compared to the mainland Indian subcontinent. In the first place, Sri Lanka had a markedly superior record in respect of quality of life, measured by such criteria as literacy, infant mortality, life expectancy, etc. Secondly, Sri Lanka also had a significantly higher per capita income. Measured in purchasing power parity dollars, its per capita income in 1950 was almost twice that of India and one of the highest in the whole of South and South-East Asia. Thirdly, the Sri Lankan economy was much more dependent on primary commodity exports (mainly tea and rubber), which accounted for nearly 30 per cent of GDP and 70 per cent of agricultural value-added in the early 1950s. In this respect Sri Lanka's economic structure was more akin to that of some of the South-East Asian economies such as Malaysia than to her South Asian neighbours.

Owing largely to different initial conditions, Sri Lanka’s development strategy also diverged significantly from the rest of the region, at least during the immediate post-Independence era. Two distinctive features stand out. First, unlike in the rest of the region, the Sri Lankan government preferred to continue with the colonial status quo in respect of economic structure, with little emphasis on either manufacturing growth or on the diversification of a predominantly plantation-based agriculture. Second, continuing a tradition that had first emerged in the colonial era, the government adopted an explicitly welfarist strategy whereby the entire population was provided with free food ration, free primary healthcare and free education up to the tertiary level, funded primarily by the earnings of the plantation sector.

The strategy worked pretty well in the short term, but the economic situation worsened seriously around the mid-1950s. There were already stirrings of trouble once the commodity boom ended after 1952. As the terms of trade declined from their dizzy heights, the government found it difficult to maintain the same level of welfare expenditure as in the past. An attempt was made to reduce rice subsidy in 1953, but this led to massive political reaction and violent protest, resulting in the resignation of the Prime Minister. The lesson was learnt and no government of any political hue were to countenance the idea of scaling down the welfare state for another decade and a half. However, the burden of maintaining high levels of current expenditure in the face of dwindling revenue forced the government to resort to large-scale deficit financing, which aggravated a balance of payments crisis that had already been brewing as a result of terms of trade decline.

In response to the crisis, the newly elected left-of-the-centre government of 1956 had to consider a serious reorientation of the development strategy. The welfarist prong of the earlier strategy was maintained, but a decisive break was made with the past in respect of trade and industrial policies. Complete reliance on the colonial pattern of production under a free trade regime was abandoned, and a conscious attempt was made to build up a modern manufacturing sector under the aegis of the state and within an import substitution regime. From this point on, the growth strategy of Sri Lanka would begin to converge with that of mainland subcontinent. The new strategy soon began to bear fruit, with the rate of manufacturing growth rising from just 1.0 per cent in the first half of the 1950s to 3.4 per cent in the second. Success continued in the next decade, as manufacturing growth accelerated to 5.2 per cent in the first half of the 1960s, and then to a highly respectable 7.3 per cent in the second.​[7]​ 

The decade of 1960s also saw a vigorous effort at strengthening the paddy sector, which had been neglected in the previous decade. From virtual stagnation in the second half of the 1950s, the growth of agriculture rose to 4.2 per cent in the second half of the 1960s. Strong agricultural growth thus combined with rapid growth in manufacturing to make 1960s a decade of resounding success, as GDP growth accelerated from 2.6 per cent in the second half of the 1950s to 5.3 per cent in the second half of the 1960s. The economy seemed poised for a take-off to a high growth trajectory.

That’s when disaster struck. Soon after the left-of-the centre United Front government was elected in 1970, a combination of internal insurgency, inclement weather, and global economic turmoil following the oil price shock plunged the economy into the throes of a grave crisis. The government’s attempt to deal with the crisis by intensifying its levers of control over the economy only made matters worse. The dynamism that the economy had evinced in the 1960s almost completely disappeared. The growth of manufacturing came down to a crawl of 1.0 per cent per annum during 1971-77. Agriculture too performed badly during this period. The growth of GDP declined from 5.3 per cent during 1966-70 to less than 3 per cent during 1971-77. By the mid-1970s, the economy had reached a nadir. It was not until a new government came into power in 1977 and launched a radical programme of reform would the economy bounce back.

Table 8

Phases of Growth in Sri Lanka: 1950-51 to 2004-05
(Average annual growth rates)

	1951-1970	1971 - 1977	1978 - 2005
			
Agriculture	3.01	2.13	2.17
Industry	5.11	0.76	5.72
     Manufacturing	4.25	1.06	6.01
Services	4.23	3.74	5.51
Total GDP	3.95	2.88	4.82
			
Population	2.57	1.56	1.41
Per capita GDP growth	1.39	1.32	3.41
			
Note: GDP is measured at factor cost and in constant prices of 1996.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.


III. Explaining the ‘Dismal Decade’

A common pattern emerges from the story of South Asia’s plunge into the ‘dismal decade’ narrated in the preceding section. Soon after independence, all countries of the region emphasized industrialization as the basis of economic emancipation and all of them adopted import substitution strategy for triggering and nurturing the process of industrial growth. In each case, the strategy appeared to succeed in promoting vigorous industrial growth for a while, until the end of the 1960s, before the ‘dismal decade’ came to haunt them. This pattern of rise and fall in economic fortunes is consistent with the standard neoclassical view that while protectionism may provide a temporary fillip to the economy the accumulated inefficiencies associated with the strategy will eventually erode the basis of dynamism. This is indeed how the emergence of the ‘dismal decade’ has been explained by many in South Asia and elsewhere. It is against the backdrop of this conventional wisdom that a scrutiny of country experiences is undertaken below.


India 

The slowdown in industrial growth since the late 1960s provided a fertile ground for theorising about what had gone wrong with India's industrialization, giving rise to a lively debate, whose echo can be heard even today. On one side of the debate was the standard neoclassical view that the follies of import substitution eventually caught up with India and put a brake on further expansion; and it was only with the liberalizing reforms beginning from the late 1970s and intensified in the early 1990s that recovery became feasible. The contributions of Ahluwalia (1985, 1991) and the regular assessments of India's economic health made by the World Bank stand out in this group. On the other side, there was a plethora of unorthodox explanations emanating from structuralist, Marxist, Keynesian, and classical perspectives.​[8]​ These latter contributions embodied some of the most novel, if not always convincing, theorising done by Indian economists on the underlying malaise of the Indian economy. A common problem with these theories is that while they offered plausible explanations of the economic downturn, they were not generally consistent with the subsequent recovery because the underlying factors that allegedly caused the downturn (for example, class structure, income inequality, the strategy of Green Revolution, etc.) did not change significantly afterwards. This is in contrast with the standard explanation, which could at least in principle explain both the downturn and the subsequent recovery within a single theoretical framework.

There is indeed a prima facie case in support of the standard explanation. The beginning of import substitution was already made in the 1950s, but the restrictive nature of the regime intensified especially in the late 1960s and the first half 1970s, when the government resorted to indiscriminate rise in tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the face of recurring foreign exchange crises. As a result, the rates of import duty (as actually collected) on manufactured products increased sharply from an average of 33.2 per cent in 1970-71 to nearly 55 per cent in 1979-80 (Acharya et al. 2003, p.52). ​[9]​

Therefore, insofar as import substitution can be shown to be inefficient, the intensification of import substitution after the mid-1960s might appear to be at least partly responsible for the ‘dismal decade’. The evidence for the inefficiency of import substitution is not unambiguous, however. One type of evidence has drawn upon the demonstration that the capital-output ratio of Indian industry appears to have increased sharply over time and quite out of line with other developing countries. This has been taken as an indication of the rising inefficiency of India's import substituting industrialization. One problem with this evidence, as pointed out by Raj (1984), is that it suffers from the use of inappropriate deflators. A more basic problem is that even if one accepts that capital-output ratio had increased in an untypical fashion, it would not necessarily indicate growing inefficiency of import substitution. As would be discussed below, there were several other distinguishing features of India's industrialization apart from import substitution – e.g., forced survival of ‘sick’ industries under public sponsorship, gross inefficiencies of the domestic licensing system, restrictive practices that prevented private enterprises from exploiting possible economies of scale, and so on. These features could easily have been responsible for the growing inefficiency of Indian industry, as reflected in the increase in capital-output ratio.

The same ‘identification problem’ also besets the very detailed study of the inefficiencies of Indian industry carried out by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) at disaggregated industry level. While the existence of inefficiencies is convincingly demonstrated by this study, it’s not easy to isolate the effect of import substitution as such from that of other aspects of industrial policy mentioned above. Others tried to circumvent this problem with the help of careful econometric studies that related productivity with import substitution over time and across industries, after controlling for other possible effects. Regression analyses along this line have indeed shown that the sectors with higher import substitution ratios had lower total factor productivity (Goldar, 1986; Ahluwalia 1991). But this approach has problems of it own. As has been pointed out by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979), what one really wants to test is whether the degree of protection given for promoting import substitution is systematically associated with productivity differences, but there are any number of reasons why the observed ratio of import substitution would bear no relationship with the degree of protection. In other words, the extent of protection-induced import substitution need not be systematically related to the observed import substitution. Therefore, any relationship found between the latter and productivity cannot be automatically interpreted as the productivity-reducing effect of protection, which is really the issue of interest.

Despite these measurement problems, it seems reasonable to suggest, at least on a priori grounds, that allocative inefficiencies entailed by the intensification of import substitution played a role in slowing down industrial growth during the ‘dismal decade’. What is less reasonable, however, is the tendency on the part of some observers to single out import substitution as the prime culprit behind the slowdown and generally to portray it as the root of all ills in Indian industry. The problem with this tendency is that restrictive trade policy was not the only thing that was wrong with Indian policymaking. At least two other sets of factors would appear to have played significant parts in inducing the industrial slowdown of the 1970s – one relates to the nature of government’s control over the domestic economy and the other to the conduct of macroeconomic policies.

From the very beginning of India’s planning, the government had maintained extensive control over the Indian economy, of which restrictive trade policy was but one manifestation. An important instrument of control was public ownership of the so-called ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, dictated by the logic of the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy of industrialization. Over time, a much more practical consideration contributed to further expansion of the public sector. Especially since the late 1960s, the political compulsion to keep alive certain 'sick' industries of the private sector for the sake of protecting employment in relatively backward areas led to marked expansion in public sector involvement in industry. The 1970s also witnessed a wave of nationalization in the financial sector, as part of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s political programme to strengthen ‘socialism’ in India. One positive outcome of the nationalization of commercial banks was the forced creation of an extensive network of rural branches, resulting in significant increases in rural deposits and lending. At the same time, however, allocative efficiency may have suffered as the government first dictated the pattern of credit allocation by requiring the banks to expand their loan portfolio in favour of designated ‘priority’ sectors, and then usurped an increasing proportion of bank deposits for itself to finance a growing budget deficit. On both counts, large-scale manufacturing was the major loser in terms of access to bank credit.

More than public ownership, however, it was a complex web of bureaucratic regulations over almost all aspects of decision-making in the private sector that was used as the major instrument of control. The centre-piece of this web was the industrial licensing system initiated in 1951 and designed to serve multiple objectives, which included conservation of foreign exchange, promotion of 'priority' sectors, preventing the concentration of market power, ensuring regional dispersal, etc. The pervasive nature of this system of control has earned the Indian policy regime the less than complimentary appellation of the ‘permit raj’. Significantly, the stranglehold of this system on the Indian economy became even more severe during the ‘dismal decade’. For instance, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Policies (MRTP) Act of 1969 required the bigger enterprises, if they wanted to expand further, to submit themselves to a special scrutiny on top of the ones already entailed by the general licensing system. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973 imposed additional restrictions on the freedom of enterprises involving foreign equity. Further regulation was imposed on the product market by the policy of 'reservations', whose purpose was to set aside certain lines of production exclusively for either the public sector or the small-scale private sector. Finally, especially in the 1970s, the rigidities of the factors markets increased and the labour laws were made even more restrictive than before.​[10]​

The co-existence of all these elements in India’s industrialization strategy demands caution in attributing its weaknesses to any particular element. Was it import substitution that was primarily to blame, or was it the malignant effect of the ubiquitous 'permit raj', or was it the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy of putting emphasis on heavy industries, or was it the strategy of assigning a prominent role to the public sector in the process of industrialization? There is no doubt that all these features are inter-related in a significant way, but each of them embodies something very distinct, so that it may be misleading to find anyone of them guilty simply by association with the others. Thus, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) laid the blame squarely at the door of restrictive trade policy, after providing a detailed and incisive analysis of how the 'permit raj' had caused gross distortions and inefficiencies. But to conflate all other features of India’s industrial policy with import substitution in this way does not help either to diagnose India's ills correctly or to learn appropriate lessons for policy. In particular, in the context of the ‘dismal decade’, it must be acknowledged that the intensification of control and restrictive practices in the domestic economy must have made an independent contribution to the slowdown of industrial growth in addition to whatever effect the intensification of import substitution may have had.

A second set of factors, involving macroeconomic policies, contributed further to the slowdown of industrial growth. One of the distinctive features of India’s industrialization strategy has been that, unlike the Latin American countries who combined import substitution with fiscal indiscipline and monetary laxity, India adopted a fairly conservative fiscal-monetary stance for the first two and a half decades of its import substitution regime (until the mid-1970s) and thereby avoided Latin American type inflationary tendencies. Since the late 1960s, this stance became even more conservative in response to a succession of shocks to the economy. First, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 led to the suspension of foreign aid, and although aid was resumed after the devaluation of 1966, the flow of aid was permanently reduced compared with the preceding years. Secondly, the consecutive droughts of 1965/66 and 1966/67 dealt a severe blow to the economy; although a widespread famine was averted, domestic demand remained severely depressed. While the agricultural situation improved in the late sixties, a prolonged period of poor harvest crippled the economy from 1972 to 1975. On top of all these, came the oil price shock of 1973. The government’s response to the cost-push inflationary pressure generated by these shocks was to adopt a restrictive fiscal-monetary stance.​[11]​  As bad harvests at home combined with rising world prices in the early 1970s to push up the rate of inflation, the government squeezed the fiscal sector further by cutting expenditure and raising taxes and restrained the growth of money supply by raising the interest rate.

These restrictive policies, coupled with the reduction of foreign aid, made it impossible to sustain the high level of public investment that India had achieved since the Second Five Year Plan. The growth of public investment fell from over 10 per cent per annum in the decade ending 1965-66 to 4.5 per cent in the following decade. In consequence, manufacturing investment in state-owned heavy industries as well as general infrastructural investment suffered badly. For instance, investment in infrastructure, which had grown at an annual rate of almost 17 percent in the preceding decade decelerated to a bare 2 per cent. While this deceleration in infrastructural investment created bottlenecks for industrial expansion from the supply side, the decline in public investment as a whole also caused problem from the demand side. In particular, it led to reduced demand for capital goods, thereby inducing a marked decline in capacity utilization of the heavy industries that had grown up in the Nehru-Mahalanobis era. At the same time, the generally restrictive nature of macroeconomic policies, in conjunction with repeated bad harvests, kept the level of aggregate demand depressed over the entire period, resulting in low capacity utilization in the consumer goods sectors as well. Thus the conduct of a particularly restrictive macroeconomic policy in the face of supply shocks would seem to constitute an important explanation of the industrial slowdown after the mid-1960s.

To conclude, it was the unholy combination of contractionary macroeconomic policy, intensification of distortionary controls over the domestic economy, and perhaps to some extent restrictive trade policy as well that together brought about India’s growth debacle in the ‘dismal decade’.


Pakistan

As in the case of India, it is natural to ask whether the cumulative inefficiency of Pakistan’s industrialization based on import substitution finally caught up with it, precipitating the slowdown in the 1970s. In the late 1960s, many analysts were convinced of the gross inefficiencies of Pakistan’s industries, even to the extent of suggesting that the value-added of many nominally profitable industries would turn out to be negative if measured by appropriate prices reflecting true opportunity costs of resources (e.g., Little et al., 1970). In more recent times, however, a revisionist view has emerged, which claims that the inefficiencies of the early stage of Pakistan’s industrialization had been grossly exaggerated (e.g., Noman, 1991; Sayeed, 1995). Whichever view one takes, a sensible discussion of this issue would have to take note of at least a couple of distinctions – firstly, the difference in the experience of the 1950s from that of the 1960s and secondly, the distinction between intra-industry and inter-sectoral inefficiencies.

The policies of the 1950s were designed to provide huge surplus to the budding industrialists by raising domestic prices of their output far above the world price and pushing down the price of inputs below their opportunity cost. This mechanism turned out to be fairly neutral among different products in as much as it raised the domestic prices of all manufactured goods above the world price by similar percentages. As a result, intra-industry relative prices had little effect on the incentive structure within the industrial sector and the relative rates at which different industries grew depended more on the availability of domestic raw materials and the size of the market. The author of a classic study of Pakistan’s industrialization sums up the implication of all this most succinctly: “The direction that industrial growth took were probably the same as those that would have been taken in the absence of major policy decisions due to market size and domestic resource availabilities. The policies adopted increased the speed with which the transformation of industrial structure occurred, both by increasing incentives and increasing incomes in the hands of the ‘saving’ sector of the economy.” (Lewis, 1969, p.111). In other words, the incentive structure caused little distortion in resource allocation among industries, i.e., any loss of static efficiency in intra-industry allocation of resources was minimal in the 1950s.

Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the industrial growth of the 1950s was also dynamically efficient. The industries that had embarked upon import substitution first – mainly the consumer goods industries – experienced declining relative prices over time, and a classic study by Islam (1967) demonstrated that this had happened because these industries had been improving their comparative efficiency as reflected in declining costs. Eventually, many of these industries became efficient enough to enter the export market in the 1960s. This pattern is very similar to the East Asian experience in which efficient import substitution in the early stage had laid the foundation for subsequent entry of many industries into the export market.

By contrast, the experience of the 1960s was somewhat different. First, further differentiation of the tariff structure and saturation of domestic market for some commodities meant that differential incentives among industries were probably greater in the 1960s than in the 1950s. Second, many industries were set up with inappropriate technologies in 1960s; they had very little chance of becoming dynamically efficient unlike the ones set up in the 1950s. Third, significant excess capacity emerged across the manufacturing sector, induced by an import licensing system that tied a firm’s access to raw materials to the size of installed capacity (Winston, 1968). There are thus reasons to believe that intra-industry inefficiency finally began to emerge in this decade.​[12]​

It is not clear, however, how significant these inefficiencies were quantitatively to constitute a drag on industrial growth. After all, the policy regime continued to provide substantial incentive to the manufacturing sector as a whole by artificially raising output prices relative to input prices. Moreover, any possible anti-export bias that protection might have created over time was to a large extent neutralised in the 1960s by the incentives provided to the exporters, especially through the Export Bonus Scheme.​[13]​ The growth-retarding effect of allocative inefficiency had to be strong enough to offset these growth-promoting factors if it were to induce industrial slowdown. But evidence suggests otherwise – the manufacturing growth achieved in the 1960s was exceptionally high by any standards. The rate of growth did slow down slightly in the second half of the decade, but it was caused primarily by reduced availability of foreign aid (following the war with India in 1965) on which Pakistan had become increasingly dependent for its ability to invest and to import raw materials and machinery essential for industrialization (Amjad, 1982). In the light of this evidence from the 1950s and the 1960s, it is difficult to attribute the industrial collapse of the 1970s in any significant way to the restrictive trade regime Pakistan had followed in the earlier decades.

It must be noted, however, that restrictive trade policy had created yet another kind of inefficiency in Pakistan, whose consequences also needs to be considered. While the trade regime provided generous incentive to manufacturing it did so at the cost of agriculture, thereby distorting the allocation of resources between sectors. The strategy of industrialization not only gave disincentive to agriculture by tilting relative prices against it but also served to transfer a sizeable amount of agricultural surplus to the manufacturing sector. On both counts, it would be reasonable to suppose that growth of agriculture suffered. This hypothesis is consistent with the experience of the 1950s, when agricultural growth was too weak even to keep pace with population growth. But the situation was very different in the 1960s, especially in the second half of the decade, when technological breakthrough supported by input subsidies raised agricultural growth close to 5 per cent per annum. Clearly, the productivity effect of the Green Revolution, coupled with the incentive effect of input subsidies, far outweighed any negative effect of trade policy in this period.

In any case, the argument based on disincentive for agriculture cannot account for the debacle of the 1970s because, if anything, the policy regime became more favourable to agriculture in this decade at least in some respects. The massive devaluation of Rupee (by 131 per cent) in May 1972 removed in one stroke the pro-industry bias that had been sustained in the past by an overvalued exchange rate. Devaluation was deliberately used, in conjunction with a near doubling of procurement prices of agricultural goods, to fundamentally alter the structure of incentives in favour of agriculture.​[14]​ Trade policy cannot, therefore, explain why agricultural growth should have been halved in the ‘dismal decade’ compared to the second half of the 1960s, any more than it can explain the implosion of the manufacturing sector.

The poor performance of Pakistan’s economy in the ‘dismal decade’ must be attributed mainly to factors other than the trade regime. It was in fact a combination of exogenous shocks and ill-conceived domestic policies that precipitated the crisis. Never before had the Pakistan economy been buffeted by so many shocks coming in close succession of each other. First, half of the country’s export market suddenly disappeared with the cessation of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh in December 1971. The disruptive effect of the loss of export market was further aggravated by the phenomenal increase in the country’s import bill following the oil price of shock of 1973. At the same time, agricultural output was severely disrupted by a series of floods and pest attacks.​[15]​

The effects of these shocks were compounded by the radical programme of economic reform adopted by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He came to power in December 1971 with an avowedly socialist agenda of land reform and nationalization. In the event, the implementation of land reform fell far short of its aim, and in this respect the programme was no more effective than similar attempts made in the past. But the disruption caused by its rhetoric and piecemeal implementation created enough uncertainty to dampen the growth of investment in agriculture.

Far more damaging, however, was the nationalization programme. In a throwback to the Indian strategy of the 1950s of vesting the control of the ‘commanding heights of the economy’ to the state, Bhutto’s manifesto declared that “…those means of production that are the generators of industrial advance or on which depend other industries must not be allowed to be vested in private hands…”. Accordingly, a number of large firms belonging to the basic industries sector as well as public utilities were nationalised in January 1972. This was soon followed by the nationalisation of the financial sector, much as Indira Gandhi had done in India around the same time. Bhutto’s original agenda did not include nationalization of consumer goods industries or private trade; indeed after the initial round of nationalization Bhutto promised not to extend it further. But he soon broke his promise, and went about nationalising a number of trading and manufacturing activities involving cotton, rice, vegetable oil, petroleum, and shipping.

All this had a severely dampening effect on private investment – the driving force of Pakistan’s growth in the preceding decades.​[16]​ By 1974/75, total investment in large-scale manufacturing had dwindled to just one-third of the level of 1969/70.​[17]​ The precipitous decline of manufacturing in the ‘dismal decade’ was but the inevitable consequence of this slump in investment.

It has been argued above that this slump owed itself much more to the joint squeeze delivered by exogenous shocks and Bhutto’s anti-private enterprise policies than to the inefficiencies of import substituting industrialisation in the preceding decades. There is, however, one sense in which past policies may be said to have contributed to the woes of the ‘dismal decade’. To the extent that Bhutto’s socialist policies were responsible for the crisis, one must acknowledge that these policies were themselves a backlash of the policies that were pursued in the past. One consequence of the earlier strategy of fostering industrialization by providing excessive protection and subsidies to a handful of private entrepreneurs, based mostly in the then capital city of Karachi, was extreme concentration of wealth. Mahbubul Haq, an influential architect of Pakistan’s economic policies, declared in what was to become one of the most famous quotes in Pakistan’s history that only twenty two families controlled 66 per cent of industrial assets, 70 per cent of insurance, and 80 per cent of all banking assets. Although the statistical basis of this statement was never quite made clear, subsequent research did prove the existence of a high degree of concentration of economic power (e.g., Amjad, 1982).

The concentration resulted partly from a system of dispensing aid that favoured a small coterie of beneficiaries. But partly it was also the outcome of a trade and industrial policy that transferred resources to the industrialists from two groups of people – viz., the agriculturists who suffered from artificially low prices of their products and the consumers who had to pay an artificially high price for manufacturing products. The inequality that resulted from this transfer of resources had two dimensions, both of which had profound implications for the subsequent course of Pakistan’s history. On the one hand, it led to growing inter-regional disparity between East and West Pakistan, as resources were transferred from the farmers and consumers of East Pakistan to the Karachi-based industrialists of West Pakistan. On the other hand, it also led to growing inequality within West Pakistan itself.​[18]​ By the late 1960s the perception of a very unequal political and economic regime had become widespread among the population and formed the basis of a mass popular unrest that combined with the unrest in East Pakistan to eventually topple the incumbent military regime. Bhutto, being at the vanguard of political agitation in West Pakistan, clearly understood the economic basis of mass resentment against the status quo, and gained popularity by promising to destroy the structures of inequality if voted to power. This was the political economy root of Bhutto’s socialist agenda. 

Insofar as this agenda was inspired by the adverse consequences of trade and industrial policies pursued in the past, these policies can be said to share some responsibility, albeit at one remove, for the economic debacle that stemmed from Bhutto’s policies. It should be emphasized, however, that the aspect of past policies that mattered in this case was not the aspect of economic efficiency, which is the focus of the standard critique of protectionist policies. What mattered here was the equity aspect of the regime. It was the iniquitous nature of trade and industrial policies pursued in Pakistan that made Bhutto’s socialist agenda politically attractive to a disenchanted populace, and thus sowed the seeds of the growth debacle that followed.


Sri Lanka

In the case of Sri Lanka, two different aspects of policy have generally been blamed for the growth debacle of the 1970s. One of them is a common theme across South Asia – viz., excessive reliance on import substituting industrialization. The other aspect is unique to Sri Lanka – viz. its policy of maintaining persistently high levels of welfare expenditure until the 1980s, far in excess of what other developing countries at similar levels of income had done. Several commentators have argued that whatever contributions these welfare expenditures might have made towards improving human development in Sri Lanka, they entailed a trade-off with economic growth, and that the crisis of the 1970s was but an inevitable consequence of this anti-growth bias of the welfarist regime​[19]​ On closer examination, both these lines of explanation turn out to be inadequate. The crisis emerged in the first instance from an unfortunate confluence of multiple shocks – some domestic, others external. While wrong policies did contribute to the intensification of the crisis, it will be argued below that neither import substitution nor welfare policies was the principal culprit – other aspects of the policy regime had far greater salience in this context.

As for the alleged culpability of import substitution, one line of argument relies on the theme of market exhaustion, e.g., "Nearly two decades of progressively stringent government controls had imposed a high cost on the economy. The net effect of inward-oriented policies in the 1970s was slow growth as the limits to import substitution were being reached in a small domestic market." (Rajapatirana, 1988, p.1147.) But the market exhaustion argument is inconsistent with the fact that when the revival in manufacturing came after 1978 it was the same old import substituting industries that led the way.​[20]​ 

A second line of argument focuses on the alleged rigidity of economic structure induced by the preceding decade's import substitution. This argument, which has been developed most systematically by Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), contends that as a result of import substitution strategy the manufacturing sector had become severely import-dependent over the years. At the same time, successive rounds of import compression had led to the evolution of an import structure that contained only ‘essential’ imports, with very little ‘fat’ that could be squeezed out of the system if necessary. As a result, when a severe foreign exchange crisis​[21]​ emerged in the 1970s there was hardly any inessential import on which the burden of adjustment could be rested. Drastic cuts in intermediate goods and capital goods thus became unavoidable, making the industrial sector severely supply-constrained; growth retardation was the inevitable consequence.

There are, however, several problems with this argument. Firstly, it is not quite true that the absence of compressible ‘import fat’ – the so-called rigidity of the import structure – was what made drastic cuts in intermediate and capital goods imports inevitable in the face of foreign exchange crisis. In fact, the import of consumer goods was heavily squeezed in response to the crisis. By 1975, the volume of consumer goods imports had declined by as much as 32 per cent compared to 1970-72. The fact that the import of intermediate and capital goods nonetheless declined during the same period reflected the severity of the foreign exchange crisis rather than the alleged rigidity of the import structure induced by import substitution. Secondly, to the extent that Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sector had become heavily dependent on imported inputs, it had very little to do with the strategy of import substitution as such. This is evident from the fact that import dependence of manufacturing actually increased in the era of liberalization following the ‘regime change’ in 1977.​[22]​ 

The simple truth is that for a country like Sri Lanka, which has very few industrial raw materials (outside the agro-processing sector), import dependence of manufacturing was bound to increase over time with any kind of industrialization – import substituting or otherwise. The relevant question is whether a different strategy of industrialization would have given Sri Lanka greater ability to deal with this dependence, and thus made it easier for her to cope with foreign exchange crises of the kind that emerged in the 1970s. This counterfactual has never been seriously examined. In the absence of such an analysis, blaming import substitution for the growth debacle of the 1970s does not stand to reason.

Let us now turn briefly to the argument that welfarist policies were responsible for precipitating the ‘dismal decade’. Until the 1970s, Sri Lanka’s commitment to social welfare had won widespread acclaim at home and abroad. But subsequent experience has led some critics to argue that it was a mistake for a poor country like Sri Lanka to maintain a high level of welfare expenditure because it had undermined growth and thereby made the welfare policies unsustainable over the long term. In this view, the travails of the ‘dismal decade’ are largely a self-inflicted injury that Sri Lanka had brought upon itself by sacrificing growth for too long in the pursuit of short term welfare. Two types of mechanisms have been suggested through which welfarism is alleged to have undermined growth – one operates through the savings constraint and the other through the foreign exchange constraint.

The savings argument is simply that Sri Lanka virtually invited the growth crisis to its door-step by spending too much on welfare, leaving too little for savings and investment.​[23]​ The alternative argument via the foreign exchange constraint runs as follows.​[24]​ When the government of the newly independent Sri Lanka strengthened the welfare state in the early 1950s, it chose to finance the increased expenditures by taxing its principal export crops, tea and rubber. Higher export taxes acted, however, as a serious disincentive to improvement of productivity of the plantation sector, thus reducing over time its ability to earn foreign exchange. The cumulative burden of this disincentive effect became starkly evident in the 1970s when the oil price hike struck but Sri Lanka was unable to counter it by expanding exports because the vitality of the export sector had already been sapped by the heavy tax burden historically imposed upon it for the sake of financing the welfare state. In short, the argument says that excessive welfarism reduced Sri Lanka’s ability to export in the long term by dampening incentives in the plantation sector, which is why the country failed to deal with the foreign exchange crisis of the 1970s.

Neither argument is particularly convincing.​[25]​ The savings argument doesn’t hold because welfare expenditures was financed not by sacrificing savings and growth but by keeping defense expenditure below the levels typical of developing countries. The disincentive to export arguments fails on the ground that the main problem on the export front did not lie in the volume of exports – the problem lay primarily in the decline of the terms of trade.​[26]​ 

Thus neither import substitution nor welfare policies can be blamed as the primary reason for the debacle of the 1980s. The debacle was indeed caused by a combination of supply shocks that precipitated a severe foreign exchange crisis in the 1970s and set of policies (of which import substitution was only one) which aggravated the consequences of the foreign exchange crisis.

The supply shocks came from various sources, but they all culminated in a severe foreign exchange constraint. After the SLFP-led left-wing coalition assumed power in 1970, Sri Lanka's capacity to import progressively declined up to the mid-1970s. This was mainly the consequence of sharp fall in its terms of trade, owing partly to continuing decline in the price of the major export crops and partly to the oil price shock of 1973. Indeed, the external shock did not cease even after the oil price rise. The worldwide commodity price boom that occurred after the oil price hike helped many primary commodity exporting countries to cushion the impact of higher oil bill, but in the case of Sri Lanka it only aggravated the problem because it was a major importer of many of those commodities, especially rice, wheat and sugar. The commodity price boom did raise the prices of Sri Lanka's export crops as well, but to a much smaller extent than it raised the import prices. As a result, the terms of trade declined by a massive 50 per cent between 1970 and 1975.

The adverse impact of the terms of trade shock on the country’s capacity to import essential industrial inputs was further compounded by several domestic shocks that reduced its export earnings on the one hand and raised the need for non-industrial imports on the other. Disruptions in tea and rubber plantations (the main export crops) owing in part to haphazard land reforms and in part to increased cost of fertilizer and a disastrous failure of the coconut crop (the third most important export item) due to pest attack severely reduced the country’s export volume just at the time when declining terms of trade was taking its toll. At the same time, successive bad harvests in traditional agriculture led to greatly increased need for foodgrain imports just when foodgrain prices were going up in the world market. Faced with spiralling cost of foodgrain import, the government took the politically dangerous step of slashing food subsidies. In spite of this unprecedented step, the cost of foodgrain import exceeded the cost of imported oil even after the 1973 oil price shock.

While these developments were severely constraining the country’s capacity to import, its ability to finance the trade deficit was also dwindling at the same time. Already by 1970, when the left-wing coalition came to power, the country’s foreign exchange reserves had been depleted, thanks to the import surge following the mini-liberalization of 1967. After 1970, loans from the World Bank were not forthcoming because of its insistence on cuts in consumer subsidies as a loan conditionality which the new left-wing government was unwilling to countenance in the early years.​[27]​

All these factors conspired together to make it impossible for Sri Lanka to maintain the level of imports of essential inputs that the country’s manufacturing sector had become accustomed to. The overall import-GDP ratio fell from an average of 25 per cent in the 1960s to 13 per cent by 1975; during the same period, the volume of intermediate imports declined by 45 per cent and that of capital goods declined by almost 30 per cent (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994, p.67). Primarily as a consequence of this supply constraint, the manufacturing sector was able to utilize barely half of its capacity up to the mid-1970s.

Policy failures did aggravate the crisis, but the real problem did not lie either in the pursuit of import substitution or in the commitment to the welfare state. The principal policy failure lay in the creation of an overbearing state – in particular, in excessive reliance on the public sector as the principal vehicle for industrial growth. The Ten-Year Plan for 1959-68, which launched Sri Lanka on the path to industrialization, was deeply influenced by the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy prevailing in India at the time, but Sri Lanka went far ahead of India in its reliance on the public sector. While in the Indian case the logic was that private enterprise could not be expected to 'build ahead of demand' in heavy industries, in the Sri Lankan case private enterprise was not trusted to have the ability to set up any 'new enterprise' at all.​[28]​ That is why, the Sri Lankan government felt obliged to take on the entrepreneurial role on a much larger scale than was ever contemplated in India. This all-encompassing role of the public sector was consistently rationalized by the Sri Lankan politicians in terms of socialist rhetoric, but in reality the perception of a binding entrepreneurial constraint was the more immediate concern.​[29]​

In the event, the Ten-Year Plan never became fully operational and the scope of the public sector remained smaller than was originally envisaged because of the failure to mobilize adequate resources. However, after United Front government, led by Srimavo Bandaranaike, came to power in 1970, the overbearing state spread its tentacles to all aspects of the economy – industry, agriculture, distribution, trade and key service sectors. The Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act of 1970 empowered the government to take over any business activity that was considered to be in the national interest and which had more than 100 employees (Kelegama and Wignaraja, 1991). By 1977, the state-owned enterprises accounted for over 60 per cent of manufacturing value-added and 50 per cent of manufacturing employment (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2000, p.80).

In pursuance of the philosophy that the state should be the main ‘provider’ of basic necessities of life, the government undertook the responsibility of importing most of the basic consumer goods under state monopoly. Public co-operative shops, spread throughout the country, acquired almost complete control over the distribution and marketing of essential consumer goods. Agriculture was not spared either. The Paddy Marketing Board was established in 1971 with the monopoly power to purchase paddy from domestic producers, and stringent restrictions were imposed on the transportation of rice and other foodstuff. Under the Land Reform Act of 1972, which imposed a land ceiling of 50 acres per individual, a large segment of the plantation sector owned by domestic entrepreneurs was transferred to state ownership. The programme was later extended to nationalize foreign-owned plantations as well. Thus, the economy that evolved in the 1970s was characterized by complete dominance of the state that left little scope for the private sector to flourish or to respond to economic signals. The inefficient public sector was also not flexible enough either to prepare for an impending crisis or to respond to it swiftly. Instead, when the supply shocks precipitated a foreign exchange crisis in the 1970s the Sri Lankan government managed to aggravate it by intensifying its control on all spheres of the economy.

The preceding analysis of country experiences clearly demonstrates that the genesis of the ‘dismal decade’ in South Asia was a much more complex phenomenon than mere paying the price for pursuing the strategy of import substitution. Wrong policies were certainly responsible for precipitating the crisis, but the real culpability lay not so much with the policy of import substitution as with the excess of statism engulfing every sphere of the economy. This was reflected in an augmented rhetoric of socialism that was sweeping across the region in the 1970s. In the case of India, and to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka, contractionary macroeconomic policies aggravated the crisis. In all countries, a series of supply shocks made matters worse. Some of the shocks were common – such as the oil price shock of 1973, but others were unique to particular countries – e.g., terms of trade decline for the major export items and disruption in agriculture caused by a rural uprising and unfavourable weather in the case of Sri Lanka and the trauma of the loss of one half of the country and unprecedented floods in the case of Pakistan.


V. Transition to a Higher Growth Path

The ‘dismal decade’ of South Asia came to an end towards the end of the 1970s. In some countries the growth acceleration that has happened since then does not merely represent recovery from the debacle of the 1970s but transition to an altogether higher growth trajectory compared to the preceding three decades. Precise timing of the transition was slightly different for different countries. The first country to break out of the shackles was Sri Lanka, around 1977-1978, and the last was Bangladesh, where the signs of transition became visible only around the late 1980s. The trajectory each country has since traversed is also not uniform. At various times, political turmoil, descending into bloody civil war, has threatened to push Sri Lanka and Nepal off their new-found growth path and back to the dismal days. India, Pakistan and to a lesser extent Bangladesh also faced similar threat as the decade of the 1980s was drawing to a close, but for altogether different reasons. Their problem had more to do with macroeconomic mismanagement than with political upheaval. As a result, what has followed since the end of the ‘dismal decade’ has been far from a smooth and sustained transition to a higher growth path for any of the countries. Yet, on the whole growth performance in the last two and a half decades has been, or at least promised to be, much better in South Asia than at any other time of comparable length in its history.

The end of the ‘dismal decade’ was marked by a decisive shift in policy regime in each of the countries. The new regimes had many common features across the countries, although the vigour and consistency with which they were implemented did vary from country to country. On the whole, the new regimes entailed significant liberalization of the economy involving softening of the administrative grip on the economy and allowing a freer play of market forces both within the domestic sphere and in the conduct of external economic relations. Growth revival in South Asia has often been attributed to this wave of liberalization sweeping the region, and sometimes more narrowly to trade liberalization. The reality is more complex, however. Closer look at the country experiences shows that while liberalization was important, other elements – for example, macroeconomic policy – were sometimes more so. And when liberalization did play a role, it was more often domestic rather than trade liberalization that was the major force.


India 

In the quarter century from 1981-82 to 2004-05, India’s economy has grown at the average of 5.6 per cent per annum compared to 3.6 per cent in the preceding three decades. The extent of growth acceleration has been even more remarkable in per capita terms – rising from 1.5 per cent to 3.6 per cent during the same period. The starting point of this transition to a higher growth path – namely, the early 1980s – is also the starting point of the revival of manufacturing from the doldrums of the 1970s. Not surprisingly, enquiries into the causes of growth transition in India have become inextricably linked with enquiries into the causes of her manufacturing revival. In trying to explain how India finally broke free from the mediocrity of the ‘Hindu rate of growth’, most analysts have thus focussed almost exclusively on the policy regime affecting trade and industry. Yet, there is something seriously missing in the story that gives the pride of place to manufacturing growth.

It is worth noting that the real difference between the final and initial phases does not lie in manufacturing growth, which was about 6 per cent in both periods (Table 6). The crucial difference lies in agriculture, which grew at the vastly accelerated rate of 3 per cent in the final phase compared to just 1.7 per cent in the first. The growth of services also accelerated sharply – from 4.4 per cent to 7.2 per cent, but it is arguable that to a large extent this was induced by the linkage effects of faster agricultural growth.​[30]​ Agriculture, rather than manufacturing, would thus seem to have been the driving force.

In fact, agriculture had made the transition to a higher growth path already in the second phase (1968-81), but it failed to induce a corresponding transition in overall GDP growth at that time because of the slump in manufacturing. The slowdown in manufacturing growth not only offset higher growth in agriculture directly, it also neutralised the positive linkage effects of agriculture on services by exerting its own negative linkage effects. As a result, the growth of services stagnated at around 4.4 per cent between the first and the second phases. However, once manufacturing returned to its original growth path in the final phase, the effect of faster growth of agriculture finally manifested itself – both directly through its own contribution to overall growth and indirectly through induced acceleration in the growth of services.

There of course remains the question of what happened in the 1980s that brought about the revival of manufacturing. Two sets of forces seem to have been at work – viz., expansionary fiscal policy and industrial deregulation promoted by reforms in trade and industrial policies. As noted in Section IV, the pursuit of excessively conservative macroeconomic policy was at least partly responsible for the industrial slowdown of the 1970s. Towards the end of the decade, however, the government’s stance on macroeconomic policy was completely reversed. Not only did the government shed its traditional conservative approach towards fiscal policy, it actually went overboard in doing so and began to indulge in excessive, and in retrospect irresponsible, fiscal expansionism. Budget deficit of the central government shot up from 4.0 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 7.1 per cent in the 1980s, while the deficit of the state governments increased from 2.0 per cent to 2.9 per cent of GDP during the same period. In the presence of excess capacity in the manufacturing sector inherited from the slump of the 1970s, manufacturing out grew rapidly in response to fiscal expansionism. An indication that demand-induced reduction in excess capacity was the main driver of manufacturing growth lies in the fact that inflationary pressures remained subdued despite unprecedented increase in budget deficit.​[31]​

On the industrial policy front, the wind of change had already begun to blow in the late 1970s in recognition of the harm that intensification of industrial control had done in the ‘dismal decade’. The reform process picked up speed especially after 1985, when a number of policy initiatives were taken to allow industry more freedom of manoeuvre. These included (i) delicensing of a number of industries, (ii) giving greater flexibility to firms to extend their operation in related activities, (iii) raising the threshold limit of industrial houses operating under the Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices Act and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and (iv) allowing companies more freedom to expand capacity so as to enable them to enjoy economies of scale.

The 1980s also saw the beginnings of change in the restrictive nature of trade policy, although much of the change consisted of simplification and rationalisation of the import licensing system rather than large-scale import liberalization. Some degree of liberalization did occur, however, as quotas were replaced by tariffs for some items, restrictions were eased on the import of intermediate and capital goods and on the import of foreign technology for the purpose of modernization and upgradation of quality.

The supply-side effects of these reforms, especially easier availability of intermediate inputs, complemented the demand side effect of expansionary fiscal policy to liberate the manufacturing sector from the doldrums of the 1970s. In some essential respects, the nature of the manufacturing sector remained the same as in the past – relying more on import substitution and domestic market than on export orientation, and still operating under a plethora of controls, but the two-pronged stranglehold of intensified controls and contractionary macro policy that had stymied manufacturing growth in the 1970s was considerably eased, allowing the sector to rediscover its earlier dynamism.​[32]​

However, a crisis soon brought the upward march to a grinding halt – a crisis that was spawned largely by the very same policies that had brought about the growth revival. The expansionary fiscal policy that had stimulated manufacturing growth had been financed by running large budget deficits at home and borrowing heavily from abroad. The result was an unprecedented rise in public debt.​[33]​ These problems were already building up towards the end of the 1989s, but the crunch came in the wake of the first Gulf War in 1991, which exerted a double squeeze on India’s balance of payments by shooting up the import bill for oil on the one hand and reducing the inflow of remittance from Indian workers in the Gulf on the other. This happened in the context of unstable coalition politics, creating an atmosphere of doubt regarding the government’s ability to manage the twin problems of budget deficit and current account deficit. The ensuing crisis of confidence triggered adverse effects on the capital account, as access to external commercial borrowings became costly and difficult. By March 1991, current account deficit reached the historical high of 3 per cent of GDP, foreign exchange reserves dipped to frighteningly low levels, and for the first time in the history of India default on loan repayment became a serious possibility. In 1991-92, GDP growth plummeted to 1.4 per cent from the height of 7.2 per cent achieved over the preceding three years.

The unprecedented scale and severity of the crisis had a seismic effect on the political economy of India. For the first time in the history of the country, it became possible to push through a range of liberalising reforms without serious opposition from either vested interests or left-wing ideologues, and the new Congress Government of June 1991 seized this opportunity with great effect. Over the next year or so, the pillars of the old economic regime were brought down one by one – the primary fiscal deficit (excluding interest payments) was cut from 5 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP, the rupee was devalued by 18 per cent to pave the way for a market-determined exchange rate system, industrial licensing was virtually abolished, clearances under the MRTP Act were dispensed with, custom duties were brought down from absurdly high levels, import licensing was virtually abolished for capital goods, raw materials and intermediate inputs, foreign investment up to 51 per cent of equity was automatically allowed in a wide range of industries, a programme of disinvestment of government equity in public sector enterprises was initiated, and steps were taken to liberalise the financial sector.​[34]​

Following these reforms, the Indian economy has passed through three sub-phases. The first sub-phase spanning the five years from 1992-93 to 1996-97 witnessed unprecedented dynamism in the economy. GDP grew at 6.5 per cent per annum, powered by a spectacular manufacturing growth 9.5 per cent. In the next sub-phase (1997-98 to 2001-2002) manufacturing growth slowed down sharply to 3.3 per cent per annum. GDP growth fell less sharply – to 5.5 per cent per annum – only because the service sector kept galloping at the rate of 7.3 per cent. But since 2002-03, manufacturing has regained its immediate post-reform dynamism and together with services has helped propel the Indian economy to a high growth path that has been sustained to this day.

There is as yet no clear consensus on the causal forces underlying the three sub-phases. However, the following hypotheses seem at least as plausible as any. The exceptional dynamism of the first sub-phase was triggered by the liberating effect of multi-pronged reforms that finally did away with the worst of the ‘permit raj’. As discussed earlier, the trend towards liberalisation had already begun in the 1980s, but only in a half-hearted manner. It was mainly the stimulus of unsustainable fiscal expansion that kept the non-agricultural sector growing at a rapid rate, until it was halted in 1991 by the accumulated stress on external balance. Since then, the private sector has responded vigorously to the liberalising reforms.​[35]​

The slowdown of manufacturing growth in the second sub-phase has been attributed by some to the alleged slowdown in the pace of reform after the initial thrust, suggesting that entrepreneurial incentives worsened from the supply side because of stalled reforms. Another possibility is that drastic slowdown in agricultural growth exerted a dampening effect from the demand side. In contrast to manufacturing, however, the service sector continued to surge ahead, despite negative spillover from agriculture, because its growth received autonomous boost from at least three factors – viz., a spectacular expansion of the IT sector into the world market, generous pay rises for public sector employees, and opening up of the financial sector.

In the third sub-phase (2002/03 – 2004/05), even manufacturing seems to have managed to overcome the negative spillover from agriculture and to surge ahead at the respectable rate of 7.4 per cent per annum. Two forces would seem to be working behind this revival. First, autonomous growth of the service sector, which came to account for more than half of GDP in the third sub-phase, must have exerted a positive spillover effect from the demand side. Second, the liberalising reforms have finally enabled Indian industry to achieve a breakthrough into the international market, as evidenced by a steeply rising export-to-GDP ratio (Appendix Table A.3).

The story of India’s growth revival may thus be summed up as follows. In terms of potential output, India had already made the transition to a higher growth path in the second phase (1968-81) propelled by the productivity-raising effects of Green Revolution in agriculture. The growth path of actual output, however, remained well below that of potential output because of the slump in manufacturing that was brought about by the intensification of incentive-sapping controls on the one hand and contractionary macro-economic policies on the other. Once the slump in manufacturing was over in the early 1980s, the actual growth path of the overall economy converged to the potential growth path. It was only then that the growth transition that had occurred a decade earlier in terms of potential output became manifest in terms of actual output as well. In an important sense, therefore, the credit for India’s growth transition goes to agriculture – more specifically, to the Green Revolution technology that first struck root in a few north-western states in the 1970s and then spread to other parts of the country in the 1980s and onwards.

It is arguable, however, that agriculture’s dominant role in India’s growth transition has diminished over time. The relevant issue here is the distinction between igniting a growth transition and sustaining it (Hausmann et al., 2004). While agriculture played the critical role in igniting the growth transition in India, policies aimed at manufacturing and services have been instrumental in sustaining it. In the 1980s, it was mainly an expansionary fiscal policy that provided Keynesian demand stimulus to manufacturing growth, taking advantage of the excess capacity that had emerged in the 1970s. This was complemented on the supply side by liberalising policy reforms that weakened the grip of the ‘permit raj’, more so in the domestic economy than in the sphere of trade.

However, fiscal expansionism that started the revival of manufacturing growth soon proved incapable of sustaining it. The price of fiscal profligacy was paid in terms of pressure on the balance of payments, which assumed crisis proportions in the early 1990s when the external economic climate became inhospitable. In response to the crisis, the government of India embarked upon a comprehensive programme of liberalization, embracing both domestic and external spheres, that has finally enabled India’s industry and services to grow on a sustainable basis by catering to global as well as domestic market, marking the beginning of India’s emancipation from the constraints of the home market.


Pakistan

Pakistan’s transition to a higher growth path has been even more chequered than India’s. Indeed, one could question whether there has been a transition at all. During 1977-1988, the period that spanned Ziaul Haq’s military rule, Pakistan’s economy did show signs of dynamism that was reminiscent of the high-growth decade of the 1960s. However, the following decade saw this dynamism disappear almost completely amidst unprecedented political instability. Another military coup, in 1999, by General Pervez Musharraf, brought back some semblance of political stability, but the economy continued to remain depressed. It is only since 2002-03 that a high-growth phase seems to have returned, although serious doubts remain about its sustainability, which has to do at least as much with the politics as with the economics of the country.

On assumption of power in 1977, Ziaul Haq initiated the kind of liberalising reforms that had characterised the end of the ‘dismal decade’ in the whole of South Asia. The avowed aim of these reforms was to reverse the statist strategy of the previous regime and to restore the business confidence of the private sector. To this end, steps were taken to denationalise a few of the industries and to soften the grip of the investment licensing system. In one important respect, however, the overall thrust of the policy regime did not change fundamentally. The government was unwilling to seriously downsize the public sector, for two reasons: first, to benefit from the output of long gestation investments that were made in public enterprises during the Bhutto regime and secondly, to garner political support from the large number of public sector employees. The major difference from the previous regime was that the private sector was encouraged to enter the areas not reserved for the public sector. These measures succeeded in restoring the confidence of the private sector, as evidenced by the fact that the share of private sector in manufacturing investment increased sharply from a quarter in the mid-1970s to almost 90 per cent towards the end of the 1980s.​[36]​

The effect of private sector resurgence was felt most clearly in manufacturing, which grew at the rate of 9.2 per cent in the Zia regime growth compared to 3.4 per cent in the dismal era, and became the driving force behind the acceleration in overall GDP. To some extent, the manufacturing sector benefited from the lagged effect of the huge investment programme that was undertaken in the public sector during the Bhutto era. Mainly, however, the improved performance of manufacturing was the result of a sustained demand expansion that led to fuller utilization of excess capacity that had emerged during the economic doldrums of the 1970s. As in India in the 1980s, domestic demand was boosted by expansionary fiscal policy, which saw fiscal deficit rise from 5.3 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 7.1 per cent in the 1980s. 

Three other factors also contributed to demand expansion. First, the freeing of the exchange rate in the early 1980s led to some 34 per cent devaluation of the Rupee, providing a strong demand boost to exports. Second, workers’ remittances, coming mostly from the Gulf region, became a major phenomenon in the Pakistan economy – with the size of remittances rising spectacularly from $400 ml per annum during the Bhutto era to an average of $2.3 billion per annum in the next decade. Third, the Afghan resistance to Soviet invasion came as a windfall for the Pakistan economy as western aid flowed liberally to help Pakistan train and arm the Afghan mujahedeens.​[37]​

While all these factors combined to generate a strong economic dynamism in the 1980s, especially in the manufacturing sector, deep-rooted structural problems eventually began to outweigh the stimulus of demand expansion, resulting in the slowdown of growth in the 1990s. As in India, the major problem arose in the fiscal sector as a result of years of deficit financing. In the early 1980s, the deficit was financed mostly by borrowing from the household sector (which essentially meant mobilising the inflow of remittances). This strategy helped to keep the inflation rate low but the price was paid in terms of mounting public debt, which became unsustainable towards the end of the decade. 

The fiscal crisis prompted a series of structural adjustment programmes starting from 1988, which apart from trying to stabilize demand also aimed at implementing far-reaching market-oriented reforms in both domestic and external sectors. On the domestic front, the half-hearted measures of denationalisation and decontrol of investment initiated in the 1980s were intensified with renewed vigour. On the external front, trade liberalization was pursued for the first time in Pakistan in a serious manner, involving rationalization of the tariff structure, reduction of non-tariff barriers and simplification of import procedures. By the end of the 1990s, the maximum tariff rate had come down to 25 per cent from 225 per cent in the mid-1980s, and quantitative restrictions on imports had remained only for a handful of items. At the same time, export incentives were enhanced by granting tax concessions, exemption from customs duty on imported intermediate inputs and capital goods, and easy access to credit facilities.

On the political front, the decade of the 1990s was marked by an intense power struggle among the major political parties on the one hand and the military-bureaucratic nexus on the other that resulted in the dismissal of four elected governments, culminating in yet another military coup in 1999. Through all this turmoil, however, successive governments retained faith with the market-oriented reforms undertaken with the help of the World Bank and the IMF. In that sense, Pakistan did have a consistent economic policy – of a liberal persuasion – throughout the decade despite unprecedented political instability. Yet, economic performance deteriorated instead of improving – so much so that during the five-year period 1997-2002 GDP growth plummeted to an average of barely 3 per cent, which was lower than what was achieved even in the ‘dismal decade’. Several factors were responsible for this debacle.​[38]​

First, the fiscal squeeze, exacerbated by rising debt servicing liabilities, made it difficult to maintain the investment rate. The burden of interest payments rose alarmingly from 3.8 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 6.8 per cent in the 1990s (Appendix Table A.2). By 1999/00, interest payment came to absorb as much as 60 per cent of government revenue, which together with a stagnant tax-GDP ratio made a squeeze on public investment inevitable. In the second half of the 1990s public investment plummeted to 7.2 per cent of GDP compared to 10.7 per cent during the Zia ul Haq era. Even though private investment rose slightly, overall investment rate still declined from 18.9 per cent to 17.5 per cent.

Secondly, although the manufacturing sector enjoyed healthy growth in the 1980s, it failed to diversify, riding almost exclusively on the buoyant cotton textile sector. Thanks to heavy subsidies and a technology-induced boost in cotton production, the share of cotton and cotton-based products in total exports increased from around 40 per cent to 60 per cent over the 1980s. But the narrowness of the industrial base came eventually to haunt the economy, when the production of raw cotton stumbled after 1992 and the unsustainable subsidies for cotton textiles were withdrawn as part of fiscal adjustment. Without the props, the underlying non-competitiveness of a large segment of the industry became exposed, bringing down the growth of cotton textiles and with it the growth of the manufacturing sector as a whole.

Third, the breakout of the first Gulf war in 1991 resulted in a drastic fall in the flow of remittances, which led to demand deflation on two counts. There was a direct contractionary effect on domestic demand as the purchasing power of remittance-receiving households dwindled. There was also an indirect effect on export demand operating through macroeconomic channels. The reduced flow of remittances made it difficult to persist with the strategy of financing budget deficit by borrowing from the household sector, prompting the government to resort increasingly to inflationary financing. Average inflation went up from 7 per cent in the 1980s to close to 10 per cent in the 1990s. With unchanged nominal exchange rate, rising inflation led to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, thereby squeezing export demand. The final straw was the debilitating effects of international sanctions imposed on Pakistan and the drying up of international aid following the nuclear explosion of 1997. For a heavily aid-dependent economy this was a crucial blow.

Very recently, there has been a turnaround in the Pakistan economy, with GDP growing at the remarkably high rate of 7 per cent per annum during 2003-2005. This turnaround has been made possible by a fundamental transformation in Pakistan’s relations with the West as the country has emerged as a major ally of the United States in the global war on terrorism. The lifting of sanctions, increased flow of aid, and improved climate for exports and foreign investment have helped the economy to recover. On the domestic front, recovery has been supported by strong stabilization measures that have strengthened the balance of payments and reduced the burden of internal and external debt.​[39]​ All this has greatly improved the confidence in the economy and reversed the capital flight of the previous decade. In particular, remittances have surged in a spectacular manner, rising to 4.2 per cent of GDP in 2003-2005 from 1.8 per cent in the final years of the previous decade, which has provided a further fillip to the economy.

In summary, Pakistan’s attempt to recover from the dismal 1970s has gone through three phases. In the first phase, which comprises the military regime of Zia ul Haq (1978-1988), Pakistan’s economy seemed to have made the transition to a higher growth path, thanks mainly to a fast-growing manufacturing sector. The revival of manufacturing was made possible by a couple of demand-boosting measures – viz., expansionary fiscal policy and devaluation, and a couple of fortuitous circumstances – viz., a huge upsurge in workers’ remittance and the Afghan war. The growth trajectory collapsed, however, in the second phase, which encompassed the turbulent democratic regimes from 1988 to 1999 and crossed into the military regime of Pervez Musharraf until 2002. The collapse of growth was triggered by several factors – a fiscal squeeze that followed the profligacy of the 1980s, excessive reliance on cotton textiles that went sour in the 1990s, decline in remittance flow in the wake of the first Gulf War, and international economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan following the nuclear explosion of 1997. Since around 2002/03, a third phase seems to have begun with resurgence of growth. This turnaround in economic fortunes seems to be based more on the politics of international relations than on improvement of economic fundamentals, although successful macroeconomic stabilization has helped to some extent by restoring confidence in the economy.


Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka the reform process started in 1977 when the right-wing United National Party (UNP), led by J. R. Jayawardene, returned to power with massive popular support. With the help of Breton Woods institutions, the new government embarked upon an ambitious reform programme. The list of reform included replacement of quantitative restriction by tariffs for most import items, across the board reduction in tariff rates, hefty devaluation of the currency against the dollar, removing exchange control under current account transactions, withdrawal of state monopoly over import trade and distribution of essential commodities, elimination of price controls, rationalisation of state-owned enterprises​[40]​ and special incentives granted to exporters of manufactures.​[41]​ A radical change also occurred in social welfare policy with the abolition of direct consumer subsidies. The rice ration system was replaced by a system of food stamps targeted to low-income groups. These changes in economic and social spheres were underpinned by an equally radical change in the political system. The parliamentary system of democracy was replaced by a presidential system, which in practice veered towards a near-authoritarian political regime that did not hesitate to use repressive measures not just against the armed insurgents but also against normal political opposition.

The economy revived dramatically after 1977, achieving an average annual GDP growth of 5.8 per cent during 1978-85 compared to 2.9 per cent during 1971-77. However, as in India and Pakistan, the high rate of growth was not maintained for long, prompting several rounds of further reform in later years. Nonetheless, as long as it lasted the initial phase of high growth made Sri Lanka, in the eyes of many, a shining testimony to the benefits of economic liberalization. Especially the turnaround in manufacturing – from just over 1 per cent in the ‘dismal decade’ to 5.2 per cent during 1978-85 – did seem to lend credence to this view. 

Yet, closer inspection reveals that economic liberalization as such contributed little to manufacturing growth. In particular, trade liberalization failed to stimulate widespread growth of export-oriented manufactures. A disaggregated study of manufacturing export before and after the reform has found that garment production was the only sector that enjoyed a significantly higher export growth in the post-reform period (Athukorala, 1986). Marginal improvement occurred for three other items – viz., seafood, rubber goods, and ceramic wear; for all other items the growth rate of exports was in fact lower in the post-1977 period! The same study also noted that the revival of manufacturing in the post-1977 period was a much more broad-based phenomenon compared to the narrowness of export expansion. This suggests that a more likely force behind manufacturing growth was a broad-based expansion in domestic demand, as was the case in India and to some extent also in Pakistan during the same period.

The expansion of domestic demand was brought about by two major events that occurred along with the liberalizing reforms of 1977. First, the government embarked upon an investment programme of unprecedented magnitude with two major components – one involving large-scale irrigation and land development under the Mahaweli Development Project and the other involving an ambitious housing programme. Secondly, the investment effort was supported by exceptionally generous flow of foreign assistance from western donors who were keen to ensure the success of Sri Lanka's pioneering effort at economic liberalization.

In stark similarity to what happened In India and Pakistan, the investment boom was financed largely by running massive budget deficits. The average annual budget deficit soared from about 8 per cent of GDP during 1970-77 to 19 per cent during 1978-83. Inflation also soared as a consequence – from an average of 5.7 per cent during 1970-77 it jumped to 13.3 per cent during 1978-89. Rising inflation eroded the competitiveness of the export sector nullifying the combined effects of devaluation, import liberalization and export incentives offered by the post-1977 liberalization programme. The real exchange rate remained virtually constant during the 1980s, resulting in the failure of liberalization to induce a broad-based expansion of exports as noted above. Inflationary macro-policy did, however, succeed in creating a buoyant domestic demand, stimulating a relatively broad-based manufacturing growth as opposed to the very narrowly-based expansion of manufactured exports. This process was helped by the easing of the supply constraint as the generous flow of aid made available enough foreign exchange to import the intermediate and capital goods needed by industry. The forces behind Sri Lanka’s revival were thus essentially similar to those in India and Pakistan, though the strength of these forces was different and the extent of economic liberalization attempted by them was vastly different.

After the initial resurgence, Sri Lanka’s growth trajectory has gone through a few ups and downs, but on the whole it has shown neither the kind of prolonged stagnation that befell Pakistan in the 1990s nor the promise of transition to a higher level as in India in recent years. The economy kept growing at the moderate rate of around 5 per cent during 1985-2005. After the effects of the 1977 reforms seemed to peter out, additional reforms were undertaken – first in 1989/90 and again in 2002/03, but they failed to spur any sustained acceleration of growth. This is partly attributable to the twin civil wars the country has had to endure in the last quarter century – one starting in the north in 1983 and continuing to date and another, less short-lived one, erupting in the south in 1988/89. But the direct effect on the economy of the bigger civil war, in the north, has remained relatively low as it did not affect the main economic base of the country, which lies in the western coastal districts. Partly, the absence of growth acceleration can also be attributed to incompleteness of economic reforms, especially reforms in factor markets, which did not start until 2002/03 and then faded away soon afterwards.

Several structural bottlenecks are responsible for Sri Lanka’s failure to move on to a higher growth path after the initial recovery. Some of these bottlenecks are legacies of the profligate macroeconomic policy the country pursued after 1977.​[42]​ First, the country has failed to accelerate the pace of investment due to fiscal constraints. The mounting budget deficits of the 1980s have led to such a high level of public debt that interest payments on past debts have become a major drain on the budget. The share of interest payment in total government expenditure rose from around 10 per cent in the mid-1980s to over 20 per cent by 2000 and became the single largest item of expenditure in government budget. At the same time, defense expenditure has risen dramatically over the years due to the civil war – from just 2 per cent of government expenditure during 1950-1980 to 8 per cent in the 1980s and 16 per cent in the 1990s. The situation has become so dire that the entire revenue is currently absorbed by interest payment, defense, and wages and transfer, leaving nothing for capital expenditure.

Second, by keeping the inflation rate high, the legacy of fiscal profligacy has led to persistent appreciation of the real exchange rate. This has eroded the export competitiveness of Sri Lanka, resulting in slowdown in the growth of manufactured exports since the mid-1990s. Third, rising public debt has encouraged the government to keep the interest rate artificially low so as to reduce its debt servicing burden. In the face of high inflation, however, this has resulted in negative real interest rate, to the determinant of savings. Despite rising income the rate of domestic savings has fallen slightly in recent years – from 16.3 per cent in the 1990s to 15.9 per cent during 2000-05.

To sum up, the initial growth revival of Sri Lanka was triggered not so much by liberalising reform as by expansionary fiscal policy, much as it happened in India and Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the initial high rates of growth of 7-8 per cent could not be sustained in the subsequent years as fiscal expansion itself became unsustainable and the long-term growth rate stabilised at around the 5 per cent level in the last two decades. Attempts were made to rejuvenate the growth process by launching a couple of new rounds of liberalising reforms. While these reforms did help the manufacturing sector to diversify and become more export-oriented, especially in the 1990, they failed to push up the overall growth rate in a sustained manner. The costs of a protracted civil war are partly responsible for the failure. To a large extent, however, the stagnation of growth is a consequence of several structural bottlenecks that have emerged as a legacy of the fiscal profligacy of the 1980s – viz., declining public investment, appreciation of the real exchange rate and negative real interest rates.


Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s growth revival lagged behind that of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – the signs of growth acceleration were evident only in the 1990s. This was so mainly because the economic fallout of the prolonged war of Liberation in 1971 made the 1970s a very special kind of ‘dismal decade’ for Bangladesh. Economic infrastructure was so badly damaged by the ravages of war that prolonged decline in production became inevitable, regardless of the policy framework adopted by the government. As it happened, it took the whole of the 1970s for the economy to recover. It was only by 1981 that per capita income and macroeconomic parameters such as investment and savings rates returned to the pre-Liberation levels. During the 1980s, the economy grew slowly at the rate of 3.7 per cent per annum, which was almost identical to the growth rate experienced during 1972-80 (Table 9). Acceleration came only in the 1990s, when the average growth rate rose to 4.7 per cent, and the momentum was carried into the present century as growth accelerated further to 5.7 per cent during 2000-05, making Bangladesh one of the better performing developing countries in the last decade and a half.

By the time the economy recovered from the post-war trauma in the early 1980s, agriculture was still the mainstay of the economy. As such, the performance of the overall economy was heavily predicated on the growth of agriculture. In the event, agricultural growth did increase in the 1980s but only marginally. The Green Revolution technology that revitalized agriculture in India and Pakistan since the late 1960s had also arrived in Bangladesh, but its spread was limited in scope. Until the late 1980s, the main beneficiaries of the new technology were wheat, a minor crop in Bangladesh, and the variety of rice grown in the dry season, which was the least important among the rice varieties grown. In the absence of appropriate HYV rice for the wet season, the most important rice growing season in Bangladesh, a major breakthrough in agricultural production was not possible. Even in the dry season, the spread of the technology remained limited because the policy regime failed to make affordable sources of irrigation available to the majority of farmers. Agricultural growth thus rose only marginally from 2 per cent in the 1970s to 2.5 per cent in the 1980s – barely sufficient to keep pace with population growth.



Table 9

Phases of Growth in Bangladesh: 1972/73 to 2004/05
(Average annual growth rates)

	1972/73-	1980/81-	1990/91-	2000/01-
	1979-80	1989/90	1999/00	2004/05
				
Agriculture	1.99	2.53	3.22	2.86
Industry	6.29	5.78	6.95	7.88
     Manufacturing	8.07	4.99	6.90	7.66
Services	5.33	3.70	4.48	5.85
Total	3.79	3.71	4.69	5.69
				
Population	2.40	2.08	1.67	1.35
Per capita GDP growth	1.39	1.63	3.02	4.34
				
Note: GDP is measured at constant producer prices of 1999/00.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.



The performance of industry was even worse. Industrial growth actually slowed from 6.3 per cent per annum in the 1970s to 5.8 per cent in the 1980s; manufacturing growth slowed even more – from 8 per cent to 5 per cent. To understand the reason for this slowdown, it is necessary to step back a little to trace the evolution of industrial policy since Independence. Most of the modern industries set up in the Pakistan period were owned and operated either by the state or by West Pakistani entrepreneurs or by other non-Bengali entrepreneurs who had migrated from India at the time of the partition of British India in 1947.​[43]​ Almost all the non-local entrepreneurs, along with a large pool of skilled workers belonging to the non-Bengali migrant class, left Bangladesh for Pakistan after 1971, leaving behind a huge vacuum of entrepreneurial ability and industrial skill. In the process, a large number of modern industries became ownerless, and something had to be done about them. The government had the option of either nationalizing them or auctioning them off to private entrepreneurs. 

In the event, the first option was chosen partly because of the absence of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial class, and partly guided by the socialist ideal of the leaders of the newly independent country.​[44]​ All large industries beyond a certain level of fixed assets were nationalized, even those owned by local entrepreneurs. In the process, as much as 92 per cent of the fixed assets of the formal manufacturing sector came to be owned by the public sector by 1972. Furthermore, limitations were soon imposed on the size and type of new private industrial enterprises in order to prevent the emergence of a dominant capitalist class. Direct foreign investment was allowed only in collaboration with the public sector and only with minority equity participation. At the same time, unrelenting balance of payments crises forced the government to adopt various restrictive measures including high tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, import licensing, etc., resulting in high and variable incentives for import substitution. In short, the trade and industrial regime instituted in Bangladesh in its early years came to resemble very closely those in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the ‘dismal decade’.

Over the years the economy has become much more liberalized. Some early steps were taken in the second half of the 1970s to stimulate the private sector by raising the ceiling on fixed assets allowed for private enterprises. At the same time, the first tentative steps were taken to start the process of denationalization, which gathered momentum with the adoption of the New Industrial Policy (NIP) in 1982. By 1985, only about 40 per cent of industrial assets remained in the public sector as compared with 90 per cent in the early 1970s. This was an important turning point in the economic history of Bangladesh as from this point on private enterprise would become the dominant vehicle for industrial growth in the country.

However, the manner in which the private sector was nurtured entailed severe long-term costs for the economy. The potential buyers of state-owned enterprises were lured with cheap credit from the nationalized banking system, resulting in a credit boom that had two deleterious consequences. First, it led to accelerating inflation in the early 1980s. In order to counteract it, the government was obliged to adopt a contractionary fiscal policy for the rest of the decade. Inflation eventually came down, but the resulting deflation of demand had a negative effect on industrial growth. Secondly, much of the cheap loan that the nationalized banking system was forced to offer turned into non-performing loans as the culture of loan default became a widespread phenomenon. The resulting weakening of the asset base of the financial sector made it harder for the sector to meet the genuine credit needs of the economy. In tandem with demand deflation, this weakening of the financial sector caused slowdown in industrial growth.​[45]​

The late 1970s and early 1980s also saw the beginnings of trade liberalization in Bangladesh in the form of modest tariff reduction, some relaxation of import control and replacement of fixed exchange rate with a managed float. Together with targeted subsidies for export industries, these measures helped reduce the existing anti-export bias considerably.​[46]​ The impact was felt in the rising share of manufactured exports in total export receipts, which went up from 60 per cent in 1972/73 to 75 per cent in 1988/89. But this upsurge in manufactured exports could not prevent the slowdown of overall manufacturing growth. Evidently, any positive effect of trade policy was swamped by the negative effects of macro-financial policies described above. Together with poor agricultural performance, this slowdown in manufacturing was responsible for the stagnation of growth in the 1980s.

Bangladesh’s eventual transition to a higher growth path coincided with its democratic transition at the outset of the 1990s. Improved performance of both agriculture and manufacturing contributed to the acceleration of growth. A combination of policy interventions and favourable external conditions helped bring about this transformation.​[47]​

In agriculture, a major boost came from liberalisation of markets for agricultural inputs, especially elimination of non-tariff barriers to the importation of cheap irrigation equipment with effect from 1988. Liberalised imports led to a drastic reduction in the price of shallow tube-well, which together with the relaxation of siting restrictions, resulted in rapid increase in the use of tube-wells. Significantly, the benefit of cheap irrigation equipment did not remain confined to the owners of shallow tube-wells, who were typically large and middle farmers, but also reached the small and marginal farmers as increased supply of water led to a reduction in its price.​[48]​ The outcome was a broad-based expansion in the extent of irrigated area – in the period between 1986 and 1996 irrigated area expanded twice as fast as in the period between 1978 and 1986. The expansion of irrigation coverage brought in its wake an equally impressive increase in the use of fertilizer, and they together brought about the acceleration in agricultural growth experienced in the 1990s.

Acceleration in manufacturing was led by the export-oriented garments sector, which benefited from a combination of policy reform and conjunctural factors. On the policy front, trade liberalisation played a key role. Between late 1980s and early 1990s, Bangladesh embarked upon one of the most remarkable episodes of trade liberalization in the contemporary world, slashing tariff rates much faster than most other developing countries in Asia and elsewhere. According to one estimate, the unweighted protection rate (taking into account all trade-related taxes) came down from 73 per cent in 1991/92 to 28 per cent in 1995/96 (Mahmud, 2004). Reduced protection, coupled with a variety of direct incentives offered to the export-oriented firms, resulted in substantial reduction in anti-export bias within the existing incentive structure. Rapid growth of the export-oriented garments sector must be attributed at least in part to this improvement in the structure of incentives. To a significant extent, however, its growth was also helped by external factors such the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) and the European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which ensured easy access of Bangladeshi garments in Western markets.

Prudent macroeconomic policy also contributed to the growth acceleration of the 1990s by creating a stable environment in which the altered structure of incentives could take effect. On the fiscal front, budget deficit was brought down – from an average of 6.1 per cent in the 1980s to 4.7 per cent in the 1990s. As a result, inflation also came down – from an average of 10.3 per cent to 5.7 per cent. The lowering of inflation in turn helped bring about depreciation in the real exchange rate in the first half of the 1990s, which played a role in stimulating the growth of export-oriented manufacturing. Moreover, the manner in which budget deficit was reduced also conducive to the growth process. Unlike in the 1980s when attempt was made to cut back fiscal deficit by reducing expenditure rather than raising revenue, in the 1990s the emphasis was on raising revenue, especially revenue from indirect taxes, rather than on squeezing expenditure.​[49]​ As a result, fiscal discipline was attained while avoiding the kind of contractionary pressure that blighted the growth prospect in the 1980s. Macroeconomic policy thus created a conducive environment in which liberalising reforms at home and favourable circumstances abroad could combine together to unleash acceleration in manufacturing growth.

The continuing strength of the economy is manifest most clearly in the fact that the country has been able to maintain rising rates of savings and investment despite declining flow of foreign aid. By the time Bangladesh recovered from the trauma of its war of Liberation, in the early 1980s, the economy had become excessively dependent on foreign aid, which accounted for almost one-third of gross investment; by 2005 the proportion came down to less than 10 per cent. Despite such a drastic decline in the flow of foreign aid, the rate of investment has gone up from about 16 per cent of GDP to 24 per cent. This remarkable improvement in self-reliance has been made possible by increased flow of remittances on the one hand and better effort at mobilising tax revenue on the other.​[50]​

To sum up, unlike the rest of the region, Bangladesh did not enjoy transition to a higher growth path immediately after the 1970s. The war-ravaged economy recovered to the pre-Liberation level by the early 1980s and then prodded along at a low rate of growth for the rest of the decade. Slow growth was caused in part by poor agricultural performance owing to limited expansion of the Green Revolution technology and in part by slowdown in manufacturing that was caused by adverse macro-financial consequences of too hasty and ill-conceived attempt at privatisation. Bangladesh’s growth acceleration came in the 1990s, thanks of to the combination of helpful policy interventions and favourable external circumstances that led to the acceleration of both agricultural and manufacturing growth. Liberalizing reforms in domestic and external spheres helped agriculture by creating conditions in which the Green Revolution technology could spread much wider compared to the previous decade. At the same time, manufacturing growth improved as a combined consequence of trade liberalization, easy market access for garment manufacturing, prudent macroeconomic policies and success in raising the investment rate despite drastic reduction in foreign aid. The result was a prolonged phase of growth acceleration that was able to survive the vicissitudes of a fractured and corrupt democratic transition.


Nepal

In common with other countries of the region (except Bangladesh), Nepal too seemed to be embarking on a higher growth path at the advent of the 1980s, as GDP growth accelerated from 2.2 per cent in the 1970s to 4.7 per cent in the 1980s, and further to 5 per cent in the 1990s (Table 10). As in the rest of the region, however, the initial phase of the growth revival was based on slender foundations. The revival of the 1980s was fairly broad-based, with both agriculture and industry making a contribution, but the stimulus was short-lived in both cases.

Table 10

Phases of Growth in Nepal: 1973/74 to 2004/05
(Average annual growth rates)

	1973/74-	1980/81-	1990/91-	2000/01-
	1979-80	1989/90	1999/00	2004/05
				
Agriculture	0.27	4.65	2.45	3.41
Industry	5.65	8.40	7.90	1.25
     Manufacturing	2.91	8.38	10.22	0.02
Services	4.04	3.23	6.56	2.93
Total	2.16	4.67	5.02	2.72
				
Population	2.10	2.30	2.40	2.25
Per capita GDP growth	0.06	2.37	2.62	0.47
				
Note: GDP is measured at constant factor cost of 1994/95. Data on sectoral growth rates are available only from 1972/73 onwards.
Source: Author’s own estimates based on country data.

Agricultural growth went up quite spectacularly from 0.3 per cent in the 1970s to 4.7 per cent in the 1980s. However, this improvement came not from any technological breakthrough but from better utilization of capacity within the existing technological frontier. The Green Revolution technology, which had swept the rest of South Asia since the late 1960s, had not yet made its mark in Nepal, with the result that agricultural growth fell away in the 1990s – to 2.5 per cent per annum.

Rapid non-agricultural growth in the first half of the 1980s was based on an unsustainable expansion of aggregate demand generated through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, in almost exact replication of what happened in all other countries of the region during the same period. Public expenditure accelerated sharply, unmatched by a similar acceleration in public revenue, leading to rising budget deficits. Development expenditure, in particular, went up spectacularly – from 8.7 per cent of GDP in the second half of the 1970s to 12.4 per cent in the first half of the 1980s, while government revenue struggled to rise from 7.7 per cent of GDP to just 8.7 per cent. As a result, budget deficit more than doubled – from 3.1 per cent to 6.7 per cent of GDP.

The adoption of expansionary macro policies did help accelerate growth of the non-tradable sectors, especially construction. However, it also made the growth unsustainable by fuelling inflation and adversely affecting the balance of payments. From an average of 7.5 per cent in the 1970s, the rate of inflation went up to an average of 10.6 per cent in the 1980s. Rising inflation led to appreciation of the real exchange rate, resulting in slowdown of export growth and worsening of trade deficit. The emergence of these macroeconomic imbalances made it impossible to maintain the expansionary stance that had sustained non-agricultural growth in the early 1980s.

In the face of growing crisis, a series of reforms were undertaken at the behest of the Breton Woods institutions. The first reform episode (1985-86) focused mainly on standard stabilization measures, but without much success. Despite devaluation, external deficit worsened further in the second half of the 1980s, and the fiscal deficit edged up slightly. Overall, the macroeconomic situation continued to remain grave. A much more serious attempt at reform came in the second phase, starting in the early 1990s, when a popularly elected democratic government assumed power. During this phase, the tax base was broadened, revenue administration improved, and trade and industrial policies further liberalized. A programme of steady reduction in tariffs was launched and quantitative restrictions virtually dismantled. The foreign exchange system was unified and current account made convertible. Interest rates were liberalised and competition was introduced in the banking sector. A third round of reform was initiated in around 1997, involving liberalization of the agricultural sector, introduction of a neutral VAT, and strengthening of local governments.​[51]​

The most important component of the second phase of reforms initiated by the new democratic government involved trade policy, aiming simultaneously to accelerate the process of trade liberalization and provide encouragement to exporters through a range of incentives. The average tariff rates were cut from 32 per cent in the early 1990s to 14 per cent by 2000, and quantitative restrictions were almost completely eliminated, bringing down the effective rate of protection for manufacturing from 114 per cent in 1989 to 8.5 per cent in 1996. The prevalent dual exchange rate system was abolished and the exchange rate against convertible currencies was allowed to be market-determined.​[52]​ Exporters were offered incentives of various kinds in order to neutralise the export bias of the previous trade regime. Steps were also taken to attract foreign direct investment, permitting hundred per cent foreign ownership in most sectors. A new trade treaty was signed with India in 1996, which eliminated most non-tariff barriers and fully liberalized Indian investment in Nepal. Taken together, these measures marked a fundamental departure from the earlier regime of trade restrictions, making Nepal one of the most open economies in the developing world.

Another major component of the second phase of reforms initiated in the early 1990s consisted of privatization and allowing private sector entry into non-agricultural activities hitherto reserved for the public sector. In phase three of reform, the private sector was also encouraged to participate more vigorously in agriculture, by taking part in the distribution of inputs which had hitherto been a preserve of government agencies and by engaging in commercial agriculture.

The reform process initiated in the early 1990s did seem to yield some tangible results. For instance, the reforms in trade and exchange rate regime succeeded in generating rapid export growth, with the result that the share of exports in GDP almost doubled from 5 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to close to 10 per cent in the 1990s. Higher export earnings, combined with remittances and tourism earnings, helped improve current account and allowed steady increase in the import of capital goods essential for industrial growth. The reforms also led to an upsurge in private sector investment. After stagnating at around 10 per cent of GDP in the pre-reform decades, the share of private investment surged to 14 per cent in the 1990s, even as the share of public sector investment stagnated.

The question, however, remains as to how far all these improvements added up to a decisive shift in the trend of long-term growth of Nepal.​[53]​ The Breton Woods institutions have argued that the reform package taken as a whole did mark a break in long term trend, putting the economy on a higher growth path. In a recent review of the Nepalese economy, the World Bank for example has made this case by comparing the growth rates between what it has called the pre-reform period 1965-1985 and the post reform period 1985-2000. This comparison shows that the post-reform growth rate was clearly higher than the pre-reform one (World Bank, 2005).

The reason for taking 1985 as the cut-off point was that it was around the mid-1980s that the first phase of reforms began. Nevertheless, this comparison is misleading. In the first place, by lumping the pre-1980 decades into the pre-reform period, this comparison artificially tilts the balance in favour of reforms. Those early years were not just dirigistic, they were also marked by very low levels of physical infrastructure and human capital that were consequences of low level of development itself. Therefore, the inclusion of the pre-1980 primitive economy of Nepal in the pre-reform period is bound to give distorted results by failing to isolate the effects of policies from the effects of initial conditions. Secondly, taking 1985 as the cut-off point is questionable because the first phase of reforms was patchy, with negligible impact on the economy. The really substantive reforms came with the inception of the second phase in the early 1990s. Accordingly, it is more meaningful to take the 1980s and the 1990s as pre-reform and post-reform periods as respectively. At an aggregative level, comparison of these two decades shows no discernible improvement in growth performance, as the average growth rate hovered around the 5 per cent mark in both decades.

The positive effect of reforms was felt, however, in the manufacturing sector, although other factors were also at play. Manufacturing growth improved sharply in the first half of the 1990s, averaging about 14 per cent compared to 5 per cent in the 1980s. A couple of other factors helped maintain this acceleration in the second half of the 1990s – viz., rapidly rising remittances, which broadened the base of domestic demand, and the new Trade Treaty signed with India in 1996, which helped by making the Indian market more easily accessible to Nepalese exports. 

Unfortunately, the improved performance of manufacturing was neutralized by agriculture’s abysmally poor performance in the first half of the 1990s. Reforms cannot be blamed for the poor performance of agriculture, though, because deep agricultural reforms did not start until the mid-1990s, and when they did, agricultural performance actually improved in the late 1990s. 

On the whole, overall GDP grew at the moderate rate of 5 per cent per annum in the 1990s. This was not very different from the rate of growth achieved in the 1980s, but it was based on more sustainable foundations. The macroeconomic fundamentals clearly improved in the post-reform period. Budget deficits came down, inflation fell back to single digits, and the balance of payments improved. So, even if the rate of economic growth did not improve a great deal following reforms, at least it became more sustainable, unlike the artificially generated growth of the 1980s.​[54]​ In the event, growth rate actually slumped after 2000, averaging only 2.7 per cent during 2000-05, but this was attributable primarily to the political turmoil emanating from a particularly severe Maoist insurgency and a protracted power struggle between politicians and the Royalty.

In sum, Nepal broke away from ‘dismal decade’ with the onset of the 1980s, in the same way as did India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, riding on the wave of unsustainable fiscal expansion. The decade of the 1990s saw more sustainable growth, albeit at a rate that was no higher than was achieved in the 1980s. Liberalising reforms, prudent macroeconomic policies and strengthening of Nepal’s special relationship with India all helped to make growth sustainable, but with the turn of the century the potential for higher growth was frittered away by the disruptive effects of a bloody and protracted political turmoil.


VI. Concluding Observations

Since the middle of the twentieth century, South Asia has gone through three distinct phases of growth. The first phase, spanning the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, was characterised by reasonable, if not spectacular, rates of growth. In the second phase, roughly covering the 1970s, every country of the region slumped into a ‘dismal decade’ of stagnation or retardation of growth. The third phase began around 1980 (early 1990s for Bangladesh), ushering in growth recovery for all countries and transition to a higher growth path for some. This paper has been concerned with explaining the three phases of growth in South Asia in terms of the impact of policy regimes.

At one level, it might seem simple enough to explain the common experience of crisis and recovery across the countries by invoking the overwhelming importance of Indian economy in the region. It might be argued, for instance, that if India plunges into crisis and then recovers, its smaller neighbours would inevitably be affected in the same direction through trade and other economic linkages – i.e., a kind of contagion effect would operate. In practice, however, this argument doesn’t hold because, odd though it may seem in the light of experience of other regions of the world where a large country is surrounded by smaller neighbours, India’s economic interactions with its neighbours were on the whole very limited in the 1970s and 1980s.​[55]​ This paper has shown that there are indeed commonalities across countries in the genesis of crises and recovery, but they reside mainly in the commonality of policy regime rather than in some kind of contagion effect. The paper also stresses, however, that in addition to commonalities there are also country-specific forces that played important roles in generating both crisis and recovery and therefore it would be a mistake to tell a simple story that applies uniformly to all.

While examining the role of policies in generating the three phases of growth, the paper has paid particular attention to a popular hypothesis and found it wanting. According to this hypothesis, the respectable growth of the first phase was fostered by the import substitution strategy of industrialization, but as this strategy was allowed to outlive its utility the inefficiencies that are invariably associated with it eventually brought about the crisis of the ‘dismal decade’. The hypothesis further contends that it was only with liberalising reforms, especially reforms aimed at trade liberalisation, that the region was able to make the transition to a higher growth path in the third phase.

This paper has argued that while the strategy of import substitution was indeed the basis of growth in the first phase, to blame it for the retardation of growth in the second phase or to credit its abandonment (or at least weakening) for the recovery of growth in the third is to accord a primacy to trade policy it does not deserve. Both the retardation of growth in the ‘dismal decade’ and the subsequent growth spurt were outcomes of a broader range of policies interacting with certain conjunctural factors. 

The most important policy failure that precipitated the growth crisis of the ‘dismal decade’ lay in the intensification of state control in all spheres of the economy, of which intensification of trade restrictions was only a part, and not evidently the most important part. In an extra-ordinary congruence of populist rhetoric across the region, Indira Gandhi of India, Bhutto of Pakistan, Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka and Sheikh Mujib of Bangladesh all invoked the egalitarian appeal of socialism in the 1970s to spread the tentacles of an overbearing state in every nook and cranny of the economy – distorting the market and stifling the dynamism of private enterprise. The second policy failure, especially in India and to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka, lay in the adoption of an excessively contractionaty macroeconomic policy in the face of supply shocks. To these policy failures were added the effects of a series of unfavourable supply shocks, of which the oil price shock of 1973 was common across the region but in addition each country had its own idiosyncratic shocks – for instance, droughts in India; loss of half of the country and agricultural disruptions caused by unprecedented floods and pest attacks in Pakistan; severe decline in the terms of trade of the most important export commodity and agricultural disruptions caused by a rural uprising and inclement weather in Sri Lanka; and the ravages of a prolonged war of Liberation in Bangladesh.

Similarly, the subsequent transition to a higher growth path was brought about by a heterodox set of policies, whose effects were accentuated by a number of favourable supply shocks. The very initial escape from the ‘dismal decade’ was engineered by expansionary macroeconomic policy everywhere in the region. The inflationary consequences of expansionism differed across countries because of differences in circumstances, but the common effect in each case was a growth spurt based on elimination of the excess capacity that had built up during the preceding phase of retardation. Not surprisingly, such artificial resuscitation of the economy could not be sustained for long as stresses emerged in the form of external payments crisis and mounting debt burden. At that point, the region was rescued by wide-ranging liberalising reforms that all the countries had adopted, with varying degrees of intensity, in an attempt to make a decisive break with the statist past. Trade liberalisation was an important part of this reform process, but no less important was internal liberalization – in the arenas of industrial regulation, financial system, distribution, power generation, and so on. At the same time a number of favourable exogenous shocks also helped – most notably, phenomenal growth of workers’ remittances from which every country of the region benefited and the Multi-Fibre Agreement which played a key role in all countries except India to invigorate the industrial sector by ensuring unprecedented growth of the readymade garments sector.

In the recent years, economic liberalization and restoration of prudence in the conduct of macroeconomic policy have created a favourable environment for the region to take off to an even higher growth path than has been achieved in the recent past. But there remain a number of pitfalls that could abort such a take-off. For instance, political instability poses a serious threat to progress in several countries – most notably, in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in Nepal and Bangladesh. More fundamentally, there are a number of structural bottlenecks, common to the whole region. Two of them are especially serious – viz., declining public investment and a struggling agriculture.

There has been much debate about whether public investment crowds in or crowds out private investment. Much of this debate is pointless, because clearly both outcomes are possible depending on the circumstances. It is arguable, however, that given the current low levels of development of infrastructure and human capital in South Asia, compared to the high-performing countries of East and South-East Asia, public investment has an indispensable catalytic role to play in this region. In this backdrop, the secular decline in the rate of public investment all over the region (except Bangladesh) is especially disconcerting (Appendix Table A.1).

In India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the main reason behind the decline in public investment has been the burden of interest payment on past debt – very much a legacy of the fiscal profligacy of the 1980s that had initiated the growth spurt. During 2000-05, interest payments have absorbed at least one-third of government revenue and amounted to 5-6 per cent of GDP in these three countries. Because of this burden, budget deficits have remained high despite pretty low primary deficits (net of interest payment), leaving little fiscal space for the governments to maintain, let alone expand, public investment (Appendix Table A.2).

The problem has been compounded by two other factors – viz., the failure to raise tax revenue as a proportion of GDP and continued heavy expenditure on agricultural subsidies in several countries, especially India.​[56]​ Low tax ratio is an endemic problem in the region, one that has seriously undermined the capacity to the state to expand public investment. Some have blamed liberalization for this state of affairs insofar as it has allegedly eroded the revenue base of the government by requiring it to reduce import taxes and in some cases taxes on profits. There is, however, no hard and fast link between liberalization and government revenue, either in theory or in practice.​[57]​ Within the region itself, Bangladesh and India provide interesting counter examples. Despite extra-ordinarily severe cuts in tariff rates in Bangladesh in the first half of the 1990s, import taxes did not fall much because of rising volume of imports, and the overall tax-GDP ratio actually increased because of the introduction of trade-neutral value-added tax. India, by contrast, has genuinely suffered from the loss of import taxes following trade liberalization, because its federalist tax structure has rendered it difficult to introduce an offsetting trade-neutral tax.​[58]​ Low tax effort is fundamentally a reflection of a very serious political and administrative weakness of the region – one that must be overcome if it aspires to invest and grow fast enough to join the ranks of high-performing countries.

Similarly, attention must be paid towards halting the slowdown in agriculture that has been occurring all over the region (except in Nepal). It is apparent that the Green Revolution technology, which had been the spring of productivity growth in agriculture in the past decades, has nearly exhausted its potential. Major investments and institutional innovations are required to expand the production possibility frontier – by introducing new technology and by promoting broad-based commercialization of agriculture. Dazzling growth in industry and services should not blind one to the fact that agriculture still accounts for one-fifth to a quarter of GDP in the region and also to the fact that the fate of the majority of the region’s poor people is still directly or indirectly linked to agriculture. Neglect of such an important part of the economy will not only prevent full realization of the growth potential of the region, it will also render it harder for the poor people to enjoy a fair share of the benefits of growth.

***








Appendix Table A.1

Investment and Savings Rates in South Asia: 1971-80 to 2001-2005
(Percentage of GDP)

	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2005
Bangladesh				
Gross investment	9.48	16.74	19.72	23.64
  Public 	5.03	5.48	6.73	6.44
  Private	4.45	11.26	13.00	17.18
Gross domestic savings	1.05	11.62	15.08	18.87
Gross national savings	5.22	17.02	20.38	24.40
				
India 				
Gross investment	17.63	21.23	24.55	26.32
  Public 	8.19	9.98	7.84	6.66
  Private	10.08	12.06	15.18	18.38
Gross domestic savings	17.51	19.41	23.13	26.82
				
Nepal				
Gross investment	16.3	19.9	23.3	21.26
  Public 	3.9	7.7	7.00	3.20
  Private	9.2	10.8	13.7	15.78
Gross domestic savings	9.0	9.75	12.8	10.64
Gross national savings		11.7	15.8	26.10
				
Pakistan				
Gross investment	17.87	18.78	18.43	17.20
  Public 	10.29	9.17	7.50	4.46
  Private	5.58	7.78	9.12	11.16
Gross domestic savings	10.70	9.99	15.45	16.52
Gross national savings	11.21	14.82	13.80	18.06
				
Sri Lanka				
Gross investment	18.97	25.08	25.46	23.35
  Public 	5.98	5.05	3.45	2.75
  Private	12.99	20.03	22.01	20.60
Gross domestic savings	13.31	13.25	16.29	15.86
Gross national savings	13.10	15.79	20.08	21.28

Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.



Appendix Table A.2

Budgetary Operations in South Asia: 1971-80 to 2001-2005
(Percentage of GDP)

	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2005
Bangladesh				
Total revenue	2.98	6.53	8.98	10.27
     Tax revenue	2.44	5.32	7.19	8.21
Total expenditure	5.14	12.64	13.73	14.81
     Development expenditure	1.78	5.91	5.67	5.73
Budget deficit	2.31	6.11	4.74	4.53
     Domestic financing	0.18	0.80	1.32	2.28
Primary budget deficit	n.a.	5.59	3.74	2.81
India 				
Total revenue	15.70	19.01	18.15	18.49
     Tax revenue	13.00	15.04	14.63	14.75
Total expenditure	20.70	28.84	26.87	29.43
     Development expenditure	13.10	18.11	14.81	14.63
Budget deficit	n.a.	8.03	7.75	9.00
     Domestic financing	n.a.	7.39	7.39	8.98
Primary budget deficit	n.a.	5.00	2.70	2.75
Nepal				
Total revenue	6.50	8.50	9.80	11.40
     Tax revenue	n.a.	6.80	7.80	8.80
Total expenditure	11.00	17.60	16.50	17.33
     Development expenditure	8.70	12.60	10.10	6.90
Budget deficit	2.20	6.50	5.30	5.93
     Domestic financing	1.10	2.80	1.50	2.55
Primary budget deficit			3.84	4.64
Pakistan				
Total revenue	16.80	17.30	17.10	14.08
     Tax revenue	n.a.	13.80	13.40	10.80
Total expenditure	21.50	24.90	24.10	17.86
     Development expenditure	n.a.	7.30	4.70	2.84
Budget deficit	5.30	7.10	6.90	3.60
     Domestic financing	n.a.	5.30	5.10	1.80
Primary budget deficit	n.a.	3.30	0.10	-1.06
Sri Lanka				
Total revenue	20.98	20.08	18.90	16.08
     Tax revenue	17.95	17.48	16.53	14.00
Total expenditure	30.85	32.81	28.20	24.96
     Development expenditure	10.69	13.34	7.08	5.09
Budget deficit	9.86	12.72	9.31	8.92
     Domestic financing	5.76	6.00	5.76	6.46
Primary budget deficit	n.a.	n.a.	3.37	2.49

Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.








Appendix Table A.3

Trade Orientation South Asia: 1971-80 to 2001-2005
(Percentage of GDP)

	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2005
Bangladesh				
Imports (cif)	13.80	13.55	16.28	20.89
Exports (fob)	5.37	5.30	10.67	15.18
Trade deficit	8.43	8.24	5.61	5.70
Trade ratio	19.16	18.85	26.95	36.07
Workers’ remittances	0.97	2.64	3.23	5.51
				
India 				
Imports (cif)	5.28	7.18	9.27	12.57
Exports (fob)	4.49	4.70	7.83	10.37
Trade deficit	0.79	2.48	1.44	2.20
Trade ratio	9.76	11.88	17.10	22.93
Workers’ remittances	0.98	1.17	2.14	3.53
				
Nepal				
Imports (cif)	16.10	21.10	32.20	27.09
Exports (fob)	11.40	11.70	21.00	17.45
Trade deficit	4.70	9.40	11.20	9.64
Trade ratio	27.50	32.80	53.20	44.54
Workers’ remittances				10.82
				
Pakistan				
Imports (cif)	14.44	17.97	17.31	15.71
Exports (fob)	8.50	10.18	13.39	12.90
Trade deficit	5.94	7.79	3.92	2.81
Trade ratio	22.94	28.16	30.69	28.60
Workers’ remittances		7.13	2.60	3.52
				
Sri Lanka				
Imports (cif)	25.13	34.69	37.69	37.79
Exports (fob)	18.89	22.00	27.70	28.56
Trade deficit	6.24	12.69	9.99	9.23
Trade ratio	44.02	56.68	65.39	66.35
Workers’ remittances		4.91	6.42	8.49

Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.
Note: Trade deficit = import – export; Trade ratio = import ratio + export ratio
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^1	  Roughly comprising the area covered by the currently independent states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
^2	  See Sivasubramonian (2000) for the most authoritative account of growth in the twentieth century British India, and Sen (1981) on the Bengal famine of 1943.
^3	  For the post-colonial period, this paper defines South Asia as comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, whereas for the colonial period the last two countries are excluded. This makes the comparison between colonial and post-colonial periods slightly inaccurate, but in view of the overwhelming numerical importance of the first three countries the comparison is still valid in terms of broad orders of magnitude.
^4	  The precise mix of departure and intensification does vary significantly from country to country.
^5	  Bangladesh and Nepal do not figure in this discussion because of the absence of their first phase from the scope of our study for reasons explained above. For the same reason, they do not appear in section IV either, where an attempt is made to explain the forces behind the economic slide of South Asia from the first to the second phase. They are discussed in section V, however, where the focus is on explaining the transition from the low-growth second phase to the high-growth third phase.
^6	  The international media enthused about the country in extravagant terms. The New York Times exclaimed in 1965: “Pakistan may be on its way toward an economic milestone that so far has been reached by only one other populous country, the United States”; the Times of London certified in 1966 that “the survival and development of Pakistan is one of the most remarkable examples of state and nation building in the post-war period.” Both quoted in Papanek (1967).
^7	  The manufacturing success of the second half of the decade was spurred to some extent by limited measures at import liberalization introduced in 1966-67, which was made possible by generous foreign aid received for the first time by Sri Lanka from the western donors (in contrast to the past when it relied mainly on Soviet aid). But the overall policy stance was still one of import substitution carried out through public sector enterprises.
^8	  Although several of the contributions draw upon more than one perspective, one can nevertheless characterize some of the more prominent explanations in the following manner on the basis of their overall thrust: Patnaik (1972) from the Marxist perspective of the disproportionality crisis; Chakravarty (1974) from the classical (Ricardian) perspective of the wage-goods constraint; Chakravarty (1979), Mundle (1985) and Bagchi (1988) from the Keynesian perspective of effective demand (Bagchi also employed Marxist as well as structuralist analysis in a significant way): and Raj (1976), Mitra (1977), Patnaik (1981), Nayyar (1978) and several others from the structural perspective of the link between income distribution and growth. 
^9	  The seminal studies by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975), Ahluwalia (1985) and Goldar (1986) have produced detailed and systematic evidence for the existence of inefficiencies in the Indian industry in the Sixties and Seventies.
^10	  For example, by an amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act in 1976, the size of firms requiring government permission before they could lay off workers was reduced from 1000 workers to 300 workers.
^11	  For insightful analysis of the evolution of macroeconomic policies over the 1970s and the 1980s and their consequences, see Ahluwalia, M. S (1986) and Joshi and Little (1994). For analysis of the linkage between restrictive macroeconomic policies and industrial deceleration, see Singh and Ghosh (1988).
^12	  See Lewis (1969, 1970) for a thorough treatment of this issue.
^13	  “The Bonus Scheme has given an effective antidote to the extraordinary protection given to domestic import substitutiing industries, since it has matched and in some cases exceeded the rate of effective subsidy received by those import substituting industries.” (Lewis, 1970, p.131).
^14	  See Ahmed and Amjad (1984) for further disucssion of these policy measures and their implications.
^15	  See Zaidi (1999), Chapter 6, for a forceful articulation of the view ‘bad luck’ played a pre-eminent role in causing the economic woes of the 1970s.
^16	  The broken promises proved especially damaging as private entrepreneurs lost their trust in the government. “His assurance of no further nationalization until the elections of 1977 no longer seemed meaningful and the little confidence that the businessmen had developed in the regime was now completely gone.” (Burki, 1980, p.118)
^17	  The next couple of years saw an unprecedented increase in public investment, and even private investment began to recover slowly, but all this came too late to be reflected in the economic outcomes of the Bhutto regime.
^18	  This inequality was manifest more in the distribution of wealth and in the economic power that went with it than in the distribution of personal income. Somewhat surprisingly, household income and expenditure surveys showed that income inequality did not increase in the 1960s.
^19	  Some commentators have also argued that welfare expenditures did not contribute much to human development either and that the country’s unusually high level of human development owed itself more to favourable initial conditions than to policy – a view that has been hotly contested by others. For a comprehensive review of this debate, see Osmani (1994).
^20	  Manufactured exports made only a marginal contribution at this stage. It was only much later – in the 1990s – that they became a siginificant part of the manufacturing sector.
^21	  The genesis of this crisis is discussed below.
^22	  The share of imported inputs in total inputs used by the manufacturing sector increased from 69 per cent during 1970-1977 to 84 per cent during 1978-1985 and their share in gross manufacturing output increased from 35 per cent to 45 per cent during the same period (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994, Table 4.2, p.60).
^23	  As one Sri Lankan commentator put it, "Before 1977, the very high level of expenditure on social welfare has been the major factor that has contributed to progressively limit the amount of resources that government could divert to maintain investment at  high level." (Karunatilake, 1987, p. 190-1)
^24	  This story is told in great details in Bhalla (1988).
^25	  For a detailed rebuttal of both lines of argument, see Osmani (1994).
^26	  It has been estimated, for example, that out of the total loss of export earnings, the division between the loss due to terms of trade decline and the loss due to reduced volume of trade was in the ratio of 83:17 in 1974 and 87:13 in 1975 – the two most critical years of the crisis (Jayatissa, 1982).
^27	  There was an obvious political dimension to the problem of external finance. The western donors were no more eager to bail out a government that indulged in sharp left-wing rhetoric (even though it was generally no more than rhetoric) than the government was willing to go around with a begging bowl, especially under the influence of the genuinely left-wing minor partners of the coalition government. Kappagoda and Paine (1981) provide an illuminating discussion of the government's difficulties with external donors during this period. For a more wide-ranging analysis of the relationship between Sri Lanka and the international donor agencies (especially the World Bank and the IMF), see Lakshman (1985).
^28	  As the Ten-Year Plan argued: "…when it is essential to the economy that a new enterprise has to be established, it is not possible to wait upon the initiative of the private sector.” (cited in Athukorala, 1986, p.255).
^29	  The socialist rhetoric had a practical value, though. Having decided to assign a key role to the public sector on the grounds of a perceived entrepreneurial constraint, the Sri Lankan government could expect little support from the Western world. They had to turn to the communist block for financial and technological help; and there the rhetoric helped. The initial wave of public sector based industrial expansion was heavily supported by the communist countries led by the Soviet Union. 
^30	  It will be argued below that in very recent years, since the end of the 1990s, the service sector may have started to enjoy a degree of autonomous growth as well.
^31	  Measured by the wholesale price index, the rate of inflation came down slightly, from 9.0 per cent per annum in the 1970s to 8.0 per cent in the 1980s. Measured by the CPI of industrial workers, however, it went up slightly from 7.7 per cent to 9.0 per cent.
^32	  Serious controversies remain on the relative contributions of different elements of the policy regime towards manufacturing revival – for example, how important fiscal expansion was relative to industrial deregulation; did trade policy reforms help more than industrial deregulation; and did the trade and industrial reforms contribute by allowing more competition in the market or by allowing the incumbents to expand their activities, and so on. For powerful articulation of alternative views in this debate, see, among others, Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003), Panagarya (2004), and Rodrik and Subramanian (2005).
^33	  Debt-to-GDP ratio jumped from around 13 per cent in the early 1980s to 38 per cent in 1991-92.
^34	  For a thorough analysis of these multifarious reforms, see, inter alia, Ahluwalia (2002), Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) and Virmani (2004).
^35	  This is indicated by the fact that private corporate sector’s savings rate more than doubled from 1.8 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 4.2 per cent during 1992-2005 and the rate of private sector investment rose from 12.1 per cent to 16.2 per cent during the same period.
^36	  See, inter alia, Hasan (2008), Kemal et al. (2002) and Naqvi and Sarmad (1997), for detailed analyses of the processes through which Pakistan managed to overcome the crisis of the 1970s.
^37	  Average annual foreign aid committed to Pakistan increased from $ 1.45 billion during 1970-78 to as much as $2.29 billion during 1983-88 (Ahmad and Laporte, 1989).
^38	  Hasan (2008) offers a clear analysis of the forces operating behind the debacle of the 1990s, as part of an excellent overview of Pakistan’s growth experience.
^39	  During 2003-2005, interest payments accounted for just 3.5 per cent of GDP compared to 6.8 per cent in the 1990s, and the budget deficit was only 3.1 per cent of GDP compared to 6.9 per cent in the 1990s.
^40	  Although there was much discussion at the time about privatizing inefficient state-owned enterprises, a proper privatization programme did not begin until the early 1990s.
^41	  Selective intervention for export promotion gave way in the late 1980s to a more neutral incentive system.
^42	  Kelegama (2008) provides a perceptive analysis of the legacies left by the fiscal profligacy of the 1980s.
^43	  Before 1971, only 18 per cent of fixed assets in large-scale manufacturing were owned by indigenous Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, the rest being allocated as follows: state sector 34 per cent, West Pakistani and other non-Bengali entrepreneurs 47 per cent, and foreigners 1 per cent (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980).
^44	  Strictly speaking, the Awami league, the party that came to power in 1971 was hardly a socialist party, or its leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, hardly a socialist politician even in a loose sense. But a significant core of the leadership, especially within its militant student wing, coupled with a large section of the country's intelligentsia that advised them in official or unofficial capacity, did have a general socialist persuasion, and this group wielded sufficient political power at the time to mould the country's policies. For a more detailed analysis of the political economy of nationalization, see Sobhan and Ahmad (1980). See also Khan and Hossain (1989).
^45	  Mahmud (2004) provides an authoritative account of the macroeconomic processes behind industrial slowdown in the 1980s.
^46	  Thus the ratio of effective rate of assistance (measured by combining tariff protection with export incentives) as between exporting and import-substituting sectors increased from an average of 0.53 in the 1975/76-1981/82 period to 0.70 in the 1982/83-1987/88 period (Rahman, 1994).
^47	  For a fuller analysis of the growth acceleration of the 1990s, see Osmani et al. (2003).
^48	  According to one estimate, the average water charge in nominal terms declined by 4 per cent during 1987-1994 while the price of rice increased by 30 per cent, indicating a substantial fall in the real price of water (Hossain, 1996).
^49	  Tax-GDP ratio increased from an average of 5.5 per cent in the late 1980s to around 8 per cent in the mid-1990s.
^50	  Between the first half the 1980s and the first half of the present decade, workers’ remittance as a proportion of GDP has gone up from 2.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent, while the tax-GDP ratio has risen from 5.2 per cent to 8.2 per cent. Together, they have more than offset the decline in foreign aid from 5.6 per cent of GDP to just about 2 per cent.
^51	  The fourth episode of reform started around 2000, but it was more in the nature of governance reform than macroeconomic reform. During this phase, the government tried to improve tax policy and administration, introduced a medium-term expenditure framework, restructured the management of Nepal’s two main commercial banks, and strengthened financial sector regulations and anti-corruption efforts.
^52	  However, the exchange rate against the Indian Rupee continued to be officially determined.
^53	  See Osmani (2008) for a fuller discussion of this issue.
^54	  An indication of greater sustainability of growth in the post-reform period is provided by analysis of the sources of growth before and after reforms. Even though post-reform growth did not differ substantially from pre-reform growth, the sources of growth differed significantly in the two periods. In particular, post-reform growth was spurred by a sharp improvement in productivity growth. Total factor productivity, which had experienced a negative growth of -0.76 per cent in the 1980s, turned around in the 1990s to register a positive growth of 0.51 per cent per annum (Khatiwada and Sharma, 2002, Table 4.2).
^55	  The sole exception is Nepal, with which India has always had a very close economic relationship, and, for a brief period in the early 1970s, Bangladesh. 
^56	  Agricultural subsidy played an important historical role in helping to spread the Green Revolution in the region, but over time it has became a sacred cow of populist politics. On the political economy of agricultural subsidies in India, see especially, Gulati and Narayanan (2003).
^57	  This issue has been addressed in some details in Osmani (2006).
^58	  In India, customs duties are in the jurisdiction of the Centre, whereas taxes on sales, such as VAT, belong to the States, who have proved less than keen to raise these taxes for purely populist reasons. However, far-reaching fiscal reforms are currently under way that might alter the picture radically.
